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Ethical Considerations in the Use of Judicial
Stationery for Private Purposes
Raymond J. McKoski*
I. Introduction
To a significant extent, codes of judicial conduct are designed to
regulate a judge's speech inside and outside of the courthouse. Codes of
conduct contain a multitude of rules governing what a judge may or may
not say,' and in some instances, what a judge must say.2 Unfortunately,
* Circuit Judge, Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois. In the interest
of full disclosure, the author serves as Vice-Chair of the Illinois Judicial Ethics
Committee and is a member of the American Judicature Society and the Ethics and
Professionalism Committee of the Judicial Division of the American Bar Association.
The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author.
1. For example, the American Bar Association's (ABA) Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (2007) (hereinafter referred to textually as the 2007 Model Code) places
multiple restrictions on judicial speech. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
2.3(B) (2007) (prohibiting expressions of bias or prejudice in the performance of judicial
duties); id. R. 2.8(C) cmt. [3] (restricting post-verdict communications with jurors); id. R.
2.9 (limiting ex parte communications); id. R. 2.10(A) (prohibiting public comment that
might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a pending or
impending matter in any court and prohibiting private comment that might substantially
interfere with a fair trial or hearing); id. R. 2.10(B) (precluding a judge from making
pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with judicial impartiality in
connection with cases, controversies, or issues likely to come before the court); id. R. 3.2
(restricting a judge's ability to consult with, or testify before, executive and legislative
bodies and officials); id. R. 3.3 (prohibiting a judge from voluntarily testifying as a
character witness or otherwise vouching for a person's character in an adjudicatory
proceeding); id. R. 3.5 (prohibiting intentional disclosure of non-public information
acquired in a judicial capacity for any purpose unrelated to judicial duties); id. R.
3.7(A)(4) (directing judges not to speak at fund-raising events unrelated to the law, the
legal system, or the administration of justice); id. R. 4.1 (restricting political speech); id.
R. 4.3 cmt. [1] (advising candidates for appointive judicial office not to make pledges,
promises, or commitments inconsistent with the impartial performance of judicial duties);
see also ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 5B(3) (1972) [hereinafter referred to
textually as the 1972 Model Code] (admonishing judges not to give investment advice to
educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic groups); ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL
ETHICS Canon 25 (1924) [hereinafter referred to textually as the 1924 Canons]
(cautioning judges not to solicit for charities).
2. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 cmt. [5] (2007) (advising
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the emphasis on regulating judicial speech is justified by the never
ending litany of improper, inappropriate, and downright bizarre
statements made by judges in the course of their official duties and
private lives. 3  Each ill-advised comment adversely impacts public
that a judge disclose information that might be relevant to a motion to disqualify the
judge); id. R. 2.14 (requiring a judge to take "appropriate action" when the judge
reasonably believes that a lawyer or judge is impaired by a mental, emotional, or physical
condition or by drugs or alcohol); id. R. 2.15 (requiring a judge to report conduct of a
lawyer or judge that raises a substantial question regarding the honesty, trustworthiness,
or fitness of the lawyer or judge); id. R. 3.13 cmt. [4] (suggesting that a judge advise
family and household members of the gift restrictions imposed on judges and to urge
them to consider those restrictions when deciding whether to accept a gift); id. R. 4.4
cmt. [3] (directing judicial candidates to instruct their campaign committees to solicit and
accept only such contributions that are "reasonable in amount, appropriate under the
circumstances, and in conformity with applicable law"); id. (suggesting that a judicial
candidate advise his or her campaign committee to be "especially cautious" in accepting
contributions from lawyers and others who might appear before the judge); see also ABA
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4D(1) cmt. (1990) [hereinafter referred to
textually as the 1990 Model Code] (directing judges to discourage family members from
engaging in financial dealings that appear to exploit the judge's position).
3. Examples of injudicious statements abound. See, e.g., In re Landry, 157 P.3d
1049, 1051 (Alaska 2007) (censuring a judge for, among other things, advising an
employee that her "Hillbilly thermometers are distracting;" writing a note to a staff
member stating that a juror "wants me;" and describing a clerk as a "shameless hussy");
In re Albritton, 940 So. 2d 1083, 1085-87 (Fla. 2006) (disciplining a judge for telling a
defendant that she was attractive; advising a woman that she needed to close her legs and
stop having babies; directing that a lawyer donate $100 to help underwrite a party for the
judge; and stating that working mothers should be home with their children); In re
Nadeau, 916 A.2d 200, 200-01 (Me. 2007) (censuring, reprimanding, and suspending a
judge for intentionally misrepresenting the professional conduct of an opponent during a
campaign for judicial office); Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Gordon, 955 So. 2d
300 (Miss. 2007) (suspending a judge for dismissing 14 traffic tickets and conducting ex
parte conversations with defendants); In re Lindner, 710 N.W.2d 866, 869 (Neb. 2006)
(quoting a judge as remarking, "Son of a bitch. Fucking Bosnian." as a defendant was
leaving the bench ); In re Halverson, Final Order of Interim Suspension (Nev. Comm'n
on Judicial Discipline July 25, 2007), available at http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/
documents/cases/InterimSuspensionOrder.49876.pdf (basing interim suspension in part
on evidence that the judge called her husband a "fucker" and had him placed under oath
so the judge could inquire about the performance of his marital duties; described bailiffs
as "bitches" and referred to a clerk as a "faux Jew;" told bailiffs girlfriend that the bailiff
was the judge's man during the day and his girlfriend's at night; and questioned court
employees while under oath concerning what others had said about the judge); In re
Merrill, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct May 14, 2007),
available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/M/Merrill.htm (quoting a judge
as advising a police officer during an ex parte conversation that the litigants "don't have
brains enough to pour piss out of a boot with instructions on the heel and a hole in the
toe"); Judicial Inquiry and Review Comm'n v. Elliott, 630 S.E.2d 485, 488 (Va. 2006)
(describing judge's "long standing" practice of advising defendants that a "DEA" light
above the courtroom bench could detect whether a defendant was using illegal drugs); see
generally James R. Wolf, Judicial Discipline in Florida: The Cost of Misconduct, 30
NOVA L. REV. 349 (2006); Cynthia Gray, Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety: With
Great Power Comes Great Responsibility, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 63, 67-74,
83-88 (2005).
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confidence in the judge making the statement and in the judiciary as a
whole.4
When a judge runs afoul of ethical requirements in private
unofficial communications, it is usually because the private
communication contravenes, or appears to contravene, the prohibition
against using the prestige of a judicial office to advance the personal
interests of the judge or others. 5 Care must be taken whenever a judge
communicates orally or in writing with individuals, businesses, or
governmental entities concerning purely personal matters. This caution
is necessary in order to protect against the appearance that the judge is
trading upon the judicial office to gain a personal advantage. The
problem is complicated further when official court stationery is used by a
judge in the judge's private dealings. A private correspondence on
judicial stationery blurs the distinction between private and official acts
and many times creates the impression that the judge expects the
correspondence to be given extra weight or special consideration because
of the power and prestige of the judicial office.6 Based upon the number
of disciplinary bodies, courts, and judicial advisory committees that have
been required to address the issue, the use and misuse of court letterhead
for personal business is not an insignificant matter.7
At first blush it would seem that the potential for misuse of judicial
stationery could be easily eliminated by the adoption of a simple rule
absolutely prohibiting the use of official court letterhead for any private
matter. To remove any possibility of misinterpretation, the commentary
accompanying the rule could make it perfectly clear that a judge's
correspondence with a family member, friend, former law clerk,
insurance agent, car dealership, school official, President of the United
States, or anyone else not involved with the judge's cases or other
4. See sources cited supra note 3.
5. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the use of official stationery by judges to obtain
an advantage in their personal financial, business, parental, political, and charitable
activities). The drafters of the 2007 Model Code considered the misuse of judicial
letterhead sufficiently serious to warrant a comment cautioning judges not to "use judicial
letterhead to gain an advantage in conducting his or her personal business." MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [1] (2007); see also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 2B cmt. (1990) ("Similarly, judicial letterhead must not be used for
conducting a judge's personal business.").
6. See In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 822 P.2d 1333, 1341 (Alaska 1991)
(observing that the use of judicial stationery for private matters is "likely to cause
members of the thinking public to believe that ... [the judge] was unable to distinguish
his judicial activities from his personal ones."); In re Nesbitt, Determination (N.Y. State
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct June 21, 2002), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/
Determinations/N/Nesbitt.htm (emphasizing judge's admission that his private use of
court stationery was intended to encourage the recipient to give particular attention to the
judge's views simply because of his official status).
7. See infra Parts III.C and IV.
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official duties must be on private stationery. Such a rule would not
appear too burdensome especially in the era of computer-generated
letterhead. However, this is not the rule currently recommended by the
ABA,8 and based upon the infrequency with which the ABA revises its
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, it is not likely to become the
recommended rule in the near future.
The current rule permitting the use of official letterhead for personal
matters so long as the correspondence does not in fact or appearance lend
the prestige of office to advance private interests, is premised in part on
the assumption that it is impossible to completely separate a judge's
personal life from his or her work life.9 Accordingly, an "incidental" or
"de minimis" use of court stationery, e-mail, telephone, and other
government property is not only acceptable but unavoidable.10 The rule
is also based on the fact that not every personal message on official
stationery will invoke the prestige of judicial office.'l A letter on court
stationery from a judge to a long-lost roommate reminiscing about their
college days in no way threatens the misuse of judicial prestige. Finally,
it may be that the current rule survives on nothing more than sheer
inertia-judges have used official stationery for private correspondence
for a long time.12
In examining the rule prohibiting the use of judicial stationery for a
personal advantage, this Article first reviews the provisions governing
the misuse of the prestige of judicial office and the misuse of judicial
stationery found in the ABA's original 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics
and the ABA's successor Model Codes of Judicial Conduct of 1972,
8. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [1] (2007) (limiting the
prohibition against the private use of judicial letterhead to situations where the letterhead
is employed to gain an advantage in conducting the judge's personal business).
9. In re Gallagher, 951 P.2d 705, 713 (Ore. 1998) ("Normal human experience
teaches that judges, like other workers, cannot separate personal life from work life
completely.").
10. Id.; see also U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct Op. 80
(1987, last revised 1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/80.html
(observing that some minimal use of judicial resources in connection with non-law-
related activity is unavoidable); cf. Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 741 (7th Cir. 2005)
("Some judges have only their official stationery and use it for their personal as well as
official correspondence, and so with their phone and their e-mail.").
11. See infra note 29.
12. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Feb. 5, 1903),
in THE HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND
LEWIS EINSTEIN 1903-1935 at 2-3 (James Bishop Peabody ed., 1964) (letter on Supreme
Court stationery inviting Mr. Einstein to dinner); Letter from Hugo Black to Jerome A.
Cooper (Jan. 11, 1952), in LETTERS OF MR. JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK TO JEROME A.
COOPER, pages unnumbered (Jerome A. Cooper ed., 1973) (letter on Supreme Court
stationery thanking former law clerk for an unsolicited charitable contribution in memory
of Justice Black's wife); see also letters cited infra note 55.
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1990, and 2007.13 Next, a working definition of "judicial" stationery is
offered together with a statement of the test employed by courts, judicial
disciplinary bodies, and judicial advisory committees in determining
whether a judicial officer has used, or appeared to use, judicial stationery
to obtain a personal advantage. Part III.C examines how the test has
been applied in reoccurring areas of misuse including the use of judicial
stationery in private financial matters, business dealings, discharging
parental responsibilities, private disputes, political activities, and
charitable solicitations. Finally, Part IV gives special and separate
consideration to the use of official stationery for letters of
recommendation, a use that has spawned more inconsistent and divergent
views among the jurisdictions than any other use of judicial stationery.
II. ABA Model Code Provisions Governing Judicial Prestige and
Official Stationery
The judiciary is endowed with great power and prestige in order to
ensure its independence from the executive and legislative branches of
government. 14  Because of the serious threat to the integrity and
independence of the judiciary caused by the misuse of the judicial office,
a central purpose of all canons of judicial ethics is to eliminate abuse of a
judge's power and prestige. 15
The first canons of judicial ethics, adopted by the ABA in 1924,16
13. The 1990 and 2007 Model Codes contain the word "model" in their titles; the
Canons of Judicial Ethics adopted in 1924 and the Code of Judicial Conduct adopted in
1972 do not. Nevertheless, each of the four ABA proposals is commonly and correctly
referred to as a "model code" because no set of rules of judicial conduct is enforceable
against a judge unless adopted by the judge's jurisdiction. See JEFFERY M. SHAMAN,
STEVEN LUBET & JAMES J. ALFNI, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 1.02, at 3 (3d ed.
2000) ("Both the 1972 and 1990 Codes, like the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics, are
models only; they have no legal effect unless enacted as a statute or court rule by the
various jurisdictions throughout the nation.").
14. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("So strongly were the framers of the Constitution bent on
securing a reign of law that they endowed the judicial office with extraordinary
safeguards and prestige."); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B cmt. (1990)
("Maintaining the prestige of judicial office is essential to a system of government in
which the judiciary functions independently of the executive and legislative branches.").
15. See In re Welch, 388 A.2d 535, 537 (Md. 1978) ("The goal of the canons and
rules of Judicial Ethics is to hold the office of judge above suspicion of abuse of
power."); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (2007) (Reporter's Explanation
of Changes) (describing Canon 3, which establishes rules regulating the exercise of a
judge's adjudicatory and administrative powers, as at the "heart" of the Code.); MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2007) (Reporter's Explanation of Changes)
(stating that the provision against the misuse of judicial prestige was placed in the first
Canon of the Code because it is one of "a limited number of general overarching
principles that should govern a judge's conduct").
16. The 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics were adopted by the ABA House of
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urged judges to avoid misusing judicial prestige in their private
endeavors. Canon 25, entitled "Business Promotions and Solicitations
for Charity," provided that "[a] judge should avoid giving ground for any
reasonable suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige of his
office to persuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute, either to
the success of private business ventures, or to charitable enterprises."17
In the context of political activities, Canon 30 cautioned that if a judge
decides to become a candidate for non-judicial office, "he should resign
in order that it cannot be said that he is using the power or prestige of his
judicial position to promote his own candidacy or the success of his
party."' 8 Canon 34 broadly admonished judges against administering the
judicial office for the purpose of advancing their personal ambitions or
increasing their popularity.1 9 Although the 1924 Canons did not mention
judicial stationery, it is clear that the Canons implicitly recognized that
official court letterhead is one instrumentality by which the prestige of
judicial office can be misused.z
The 1972 Model Code continued specific prohibitions against
(1) using the prestige of judicial office to solicit assistance for
educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, and civic organizations;
21
(2) exploiting the prestige of judicial office in financial and business
dealings; 22 and (3) misusing judicial prestige by remaining a judge while
Delegates on July 9, 1924. See LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA
JUDICIALCODE 131 (1992).
17. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 25 (1924); see also id. Canon 31 (cautioning
judges who retain a law practice to avoid conduct that utilizes or seems to utilize the
judicial office to further their private law business).
18. Id. Canon 30 (amended 1933). As enacted in 1924, Canon 30 did not include a
"resign to run" rule but did state that a judge "should decline nomination to any other
place which might reasonably tend to create a suspicion or criticism that the proper
performance of his judicial duties is prejudiced or prevented thereby." In its original
form, Canon 30 further provided that if a judge became a candidate for another office he
should refrain from all conduct which might arouse suspicion that he was using judicial
power or prestige to promote his candidacy or party. See MILORD, supra note 16 at 140
n.3.
19. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 34 (1924).
20. See, e.g., In re Vasser, 382 A.2d 1114, 1116-17 (N.J. 1978) (noting that the use
of court letterhead by a part-time judge in his private law practice violates Canon 31 of
the 1924 Canons); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Informal Op. 1211
(1972) (finding that the use of court stationery to solicit membership in the ABA violates
Canons 4 and 25 of the 1924 Canons); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility,
Informal Op. 817 (1965) (finding that soliciting support for a judicial candidate on court
stationery violates Canon 30 of the 1924 Canons).
21. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5B(2) (1972).
22. Id. Canon 5C(l); see also E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT 81 (1973) ("The aim [of Canon 5C(1)] is to prevent the appearance to
litigants, lawyers, and the public that patronizing the business in which a judge is actively
involved will work to the advantage of the litigant, or that failure to patronize the
business will work to his disadvantage.").
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running for non-judicial office.23 Canon 2 of the new code also added an
all-encompassing general provision protecting against the misuse of
office by providing that a judge "should not lend the prestige of his
office to advance the private interests of others. 24  Like the 1924
Canons, the 1972 Model Code contained no express reference to judicial
stationery. However, the absence of a specific caution against misusing
official letterhead did not deter courts from relying on the 1972 Code to
condemn the use of judicial stationery for the purpose of pursuing a
personal advantage.25
The clause of Canon 2B of the 1972 Model Code warning that a
judge "should not lend the prestige of his office to advance the private
interests of others," was incorporated into the 1990 Model Code with
gender-neutral language and two modifications.26 First, the provision
was rendered mandatory by replacing the aspirational word "should"
with the word "shall." Second, a change was made to clarify that a judge
may not lend the prestige of office to advance the private interests of "the
judge or others. 27 The 1990 Code was the first ABA Model Code to
mention judicial stationery. The Commentary to Canon 2B of the 1990
Model Code provided:
Judges should distinguish between proper and improper use of the
prestige of office in all of their activities. For example, it would be
improper for a judge to allude to his or her judgeship to gain a
personal advantage such as deferential treatment when stopped by a
police officer for a traffic offense. Similarly, judicial letterhead must
not be used for conducting a judge's personal business.
2 8
Although the concluding sentence of the Commentary to Canon 2B
23. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7A(3) (1972).
24. Id. Canon 2B.
25. In re Vasser, 382 A.2d 1114, 1116-17 (N.J. 1978) (concluding that the misuse of
court letterhead violates Canons 1 and 2 of the 1972 Model Code); In re Harned, 357
N.W.2d 300, 301-02 (Iowa 1984) (holding that a letter on official stationery to a
magistrate concerning the judge's daughter's traffic ticket violates Canons 1 and 2 of the
1972 Model Code).
26. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1990).
27. Id. (emphasis added). The relevant part of Canon 2B of the 1990 Model Code
reads, "A judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private
interests of the judge or others." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1990).
As did its predecessors, the 1990 Model Code includes specific prohibitions against
misusing the prestige of judicial office in charitable and business dealings. Id. Canon
4C(3)(b)(iv) (providing that a judge "shall not use or permit the use of the prestige of
judicial office for [charitable] fund-raising or membership solicitation"); id. Canon
4D(1)(a) ("A judge shall not engage in financial and business dealings that may
reasonably be perceived to exploit the judge's judicial position."); id. Canon 4G cmt.
(cautioning judges not to abuse the prestige of office when acting pro se in legal matters).
28. Id. Canon 2B cmt. (emphasis added).
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could be read as completely barring the use of judicial stationery for any
unofficial purpose, a flat prohibition was not intended. When read in the
context of Canon 2B and the entire Commentary, it is clear that the
provision was intended to prohibit the private use of official stationery
only when a private advantage is, or appears to be, sought.29
Based upon the recommendation of a special committee established
to study and revise the 1990 Code,30 the ABA House of Delegates
29. The personal use of judicial stationery does not in every instance invoke the
prestige of judicial office. If the choice of court letterhead in the context of a particular
correspondence cannot be reasonably perceived as an attempt to secure a personal
advantage, no violation of Canon 2B of the 1972 or 1990 Model Code occurs. As noted
in the Reporter's Explanation of Changes to Comment [1] of Rule 1.3 of the 2007 Model
Code, "[t]hcrc are times when a judge might draft a personal note on stationery that
includes the judge's title that could not conceivably enable the judge to 'gain advantage,'
as, for example, when the judge corresponds with a long-time acquaintance who is well
aware of the judge's position." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [1]
(2007) (Reporter's Explanation of Changes). This was understood at the time Canon 2B
of the 1990 Model Code was drafted. For examples of private correspondence on official
stationery that have been determined not to violate Canon 2B because no personal
advantage was sought, see infra Part III.C. 1. Moreover, disciplinary commissions and
ethics advisory committees have consistently interpreted Canon 2B under both the 1972
and 1990 Model Codes as prohibiting the use of judicial letterhead for personal
correspondence only where it is employed, or appears to be employed, to seek a personal
advantage or otherwise exploit the judicial office. See infra Part III.C.2.
30. The Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (Joint
Commission or Commission) was created by the ABA in September 2003. In a very
open and transparent process, the Joint Commission developed successive drafts of a
proposed revised model code and disseminated each draft for public comment. The first
discussion drafts of what eventually became the 2007 Model Code were released between
May 11, 2004 and May 27, 2005, and are available at http://abanet.org/
judicialethics/drafts.html. The discussion draft of Canon 3 was released on July 19,
2004, and is cited in this Article as the "MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3
(2007) (Discussion Draft July 2004)." On June 30, 2005, the Joint Commission issued a
Preliminary Report including a "Preliminary Draft, ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct" [hereinafter MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007) (Preliminary Draft
June 2005)], available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/preliminaryreport.html. A
"Final Draft Report," released in December 2005 [hereinafter MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (2007) (Final Draft Report Dec. 2005)] is available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/finaldraftreport.html. The Commission issued yet
another revised draft as part of a document entitled "ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct Report November 2006" [hereinafter MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007) (Report Nov. 2006)]. The November 2006 Report included
a revised draft of the Model Code together with a "Reporter's Explanation of Changes"
describing the differences between the 1990 Model Code and the November 2006
proposed draft. The November 2006 Report is available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/report.pdf. On December 20, 2006, the Commission's final "Report,"
available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/house -report.html., was submitted to
the ABA House of Delegates. This Report, also containing a Reporter's Explanation of
Changes, is cited in this Article as the "MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007)
(House Report Dec. 2006)." Ten amendments to the December 2006 Report were filed
with the House of Delegates on February 6, 2007, and are available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/revisions-report.html. The 2007 Model Code
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adopted a new Model Code on February 12, 2007.3" The 2007 Model
Code continues the general prohibition against misuse of judicial prestige
in Rule 1.3 by stating that "[a] judge shall not abuse the prestige of
judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge
or others, or allow others to do so."'32 Rule 1.3 differs in one material
respect from the misuse of prestige provision found in Canon 2B of the
1990 Model Code. Because of the "unnecessary confusion" the word
"lend" created in Canon 2B, it was replaced with the word "abuse."
33
According to the Reporter's Explanation of Changes, the drafters of Rule
1.3 were concerned that some judges declined to write recommendation
letters for their clerks under the 1990 Code because to do so, in their
minds, "lent" the prestige of office to advance the clerks' private
interests.34 To avoid such an overbroad reading of the evils intended to
be prevented by Canon 2B, Rule 1.3 of the 2007 Model Code was
clarified to prohibit only the "abuse" of judicial prestige.35 It is also
important to note that Comment [1] to Rule 1.3 reworks the last sentence
of the Comment to Canon 2B of the 1990 Model Code to clarify that the
private use of judicial letterhead is not categorically forbidden, but only
prohibited if the letterhead is used "to gain an advantage in
conducting... [the judge's] personal business.,
36
The 2007 Model Code also contains commentary specifically
addressing the propriety of using official stationery for letters of
recommendation. Comment [2] to Rule 1.3 of the 2007 Model Code
states:
A judge may provide a reference or recommendation for an
individual based on the judge's personal knowledge. The judge may
use official letterhead if the judge indicates that the reference is
personal and if there is no likelihood that the use of the letterhead
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates and the Reporter's Explanation of Changes are
available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/approvedMCJC-html. The Reporter's
Explanation of Changes serves as a valuable aid in interpreting the new code but was not
adopted by the House of Delegates.
31. See Press Release, ABA Adopts Policies Revising Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, Opposing Criminalization of Homelessness, Calling for Regulation of Boot
Camps (Feb.13, 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/abanet/media/release/
newsrelease.cfin?releaseid=80 (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
32. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007) (emphasis added).
33. Id. (Reporter's Explanation of Changes).
34. Id.
35. Id. R. 1.3 differs from Canon 2B of the 1990 Code in other ways. The new rule
directs judges not to allow friends and relatives to invoke the judge's prestige in their
dealings. It also removes any doubt that the advancement of "economic" interests as well
as "personal" interests is prohibited. Lastly, the word "personal" replaced the word
"private" for purely stylistic reasons. Id.
36. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [1] (2007) (emphasis added).
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would reasonably be perceived as an attempt to exert pressure by
reason of the judicial office.
37
This first attempt by an ABA Model Code to provide guidance on
an issue that has divided courts and other bodies responsible for enacting
and interpreting judicial codes of conduct will be examined in detail in
Part IV of this Article.
III. Proper and Improper Personal Uses of Judicial Stationery
A. What Makes Stationery "Judicial?"
Most judges are provided letterhead containing the name and
address of the court upon which the judge serves.38 In many instances,
the letterhead also includes the judge's name, title, telephone number,
fax number, e-mail address, and court seal or other logo.39  Judicial
letterhead is referred to by many other names including, "official,"
"court," and "office" letterhead or stationery.n  All of these
interchangeable terms refer to letterhead provided at government expense
containing official court designations, titles, and addresses "suitable for
official judicial correspondence.",4 1  Judicial letterhead includes
"chambers" stationery42 and is not necessarily transformed into personal
37. Id. cmt. [2].
38. Legislatures have recognized a duty to provide the judicial branch with the
facilities and supplies, including stationery, necessary to perform the judicial function.
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. 19-212c (2006) (directing county commissioners to establish
a uniform "stationery letterhead" for use in the various courts); MINN. STAT. 375.14
(2006) (requiring the county board to provide stationery and letterhead to judges of the
district court); NEB. REv. STAT. 23-121 (2007) (requiring the county board to provide
stationery for use of the county judge); N.Y. COUNTY LAW 942 (McKinney 2007)
(mandating that the New York City Board of Estimate provide resident judges and
justices with stationery suitable and sufficient for the transaction of its business).
39. The various styles of judicial letterhead supplied to the courts of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts are illustrated at
http://www.eaglegraphicsprinters.com/common-court-lthds.htm (last visited Oct. 2,
2007).
40. The 2007 Model Code uses the terms "judicial letterhead" and "official
letterhead" interchangeably. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmts. [1]-[2]
(2007). The Reporter's Explanation of Changes accompanying Rule 1.3 uses the terms
"judicial letterhead" and "office letterhead." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3
cmts. [ 1]-[2] (2007) (Reporter's Explanation of Changes).
41. Tex. Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 137 (1990), available at
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/judethics/1 31-140.htm (defining judicial letterhead as
"letterhead that shows a judge's title, position, and office address and is suitable for
official judicial correspondence").
42. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 822 P.2d 1333, 1340-41 (Alaska 1991)
(characterizing the judge's "chambers" stationery, reproduced in an appendix to the
opinion, as one type of judicial stationery). For another example of "chambers"
stationery see In re Di Loreto, Public Admonishment (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial
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stationery by adding a disclaimer of "personal, 43 or "personal and
unofficial, 44 to the stationery.
Communications prohibited from appearing on judicial letterhead
are also prohibited from appearing on personal stationery if the personal
stationery could be confused with the judge's official stationery. 5 The
controlling consideration is not whether an astute observer familiar with
the intricacies of government stationery might be able to distinguish
personal from official stationery, but whether the letterhead contains
information, designations, or symbols that an ordinary observer would
associate with the judge's professional responsibilities rather than the
judge's personal undertakings.46  Using the judicial title on personal
stationery does not necessarily mean that confusion between official and
personal stationery is likely, 47 but including the judge's courthouse or
chambers address on personal stationery is a strong indication to an
ordinary reasonable observer of the official nature of the stationery.48
Performance June 13, 2006), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdm/
Di%20Loreto%20D&O%206-13-06.pdf (describing a judge's letter as appearing on
"chambers judicial stationery").
43. In re Di Loreto, Public Admonishment (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial Performance
June 13, 2006), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdm/Di%20Loreto%20D&O%206-13-
06.pdf. (finding that including the parenthetical "personal" was irrelevant in deciding
whether the use of the letterhead in a private dispute violated Canon 2B); In re Mogil,
673 N.E.2d 896, 898 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that a threatening and offensive
communication on judicial stationery would be perceived as representing the judge's
official viewpoint notwithstanding the indication in the letter that the views expressed
were "personal").
44. In re Nesbitt, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct June 21,
2002), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/N/Nesbitt.htm (rejecting
argument that placing the phrase "personal and unofficial" on court stationery used in a
private dispute precluded finding that judge misused the prestige of office).
45. See, e.g., Public Admonishment of Coates (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial
Performance April 12, 2000), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdm/Coates%2004-12-
00.pdf (disciplining judge, in part, for sending letters to an automobile dealer and
mortgage company on personal stationery listing the courthouse address and telephone
number and including the designation "Judge" beneath the signature line).
46. See Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n Op. 00-746 (2000), available at
http://www.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/aoOO-746.htm (concluding that use of the state seal on
campaign stationery would give the "casual observer" the impression that a
correspondence was on official letterhead).
47. In re Moynihan, Stipulation, Agreement and Order of Admonishment (Wash.
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 1, 1993), available at http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/
Case%20MaterialUI993/1427/1427%20Stipulation.pdf (observing that it is not improper
to have private stationery bearing the title "judge" so long as it can not be confused with
the judge's official stationery). But see ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B
cmt. (2007) ("Similarly, judicial letterhead or any stationery identifying the judge as such
must not be used for conducting a judge's personal business.").
48. In re Moynihan, Stipulation, Agreement and Order of Admonishment (Wash.
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 1, 1993), available at http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/
Case%20Material/1993/1427/1427%20Stipulation.pdf (concluding that to avoid
confusion, personal stationery should omit the judge's official address); Wash. Ethics
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B. The Test
In determining whether judicial letterhead is used to gain an
advantage in personal affairs, the judge's subjective intent in choosing
the letterhead is not important. 49 Thus, the fact that a judge does not
intend to influence anyone by using official stationery or only uses
official stationery because he or she "ran out" of personal stationery is
irrelevant. 50 Nor is it relevant that the recipient of a letter is not actually
influenced by the official nature of the stationery. 51 Because appearances
are just as important as realities in judicial ethics, 52 an objective test is
employed. Under this test, a judge misuses court stationery whenever an
ordinary observer would reasonably conclude that the stationery was
used in an attempt to gain a personal advantage.53 In making this
Advisory Comm. Op. 86-15 (1986), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/
programs.orgs/pos.ethics/?fa=posethics.dispopin&mode=8615 (same).
49. Mosley v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 102 P.3d 555, 560 (Nev. 2004)
("[A] judge is not to be evaluated by a subjective standard .. "); In re Pastrick,
Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct Aug. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/determinations/P/Pastrick.htm (disciplining judge for
appearing to trade on judicial prestige to aid his daughter's job search regardless of the
judge's subjective intent); ABA ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 32
(2004) ("Because the standard for determining the appearance of impropriety is objective,
a judge's own perception of motivation for behavior is irrelevant to the analysis.").
50. In re Gallagher, 951 P.2d 705, 715 (Ore. 1998).
51. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 822 P.2d 1333, 1341 (Alaska 1991).
52. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 565 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In
matters of ethics, appearance and reality often converge as one."); Hall v. Small Business
Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 176 (5th Cir.1983) ("Judicial ethics reinforced by statute exact
more than virtuous behavior; they command impeccable appearance."); In re Dean, 717
A.2d 176, 184 (Conn. 1998) ("Avoiding the appearance of impropriety is as important to
developing public confidence in the judiciary as avoiding impropriety itself."); In re
Harriss, 4 N.E.2d 387, 388 (I11. 1936) (observing that the 1924 Canons "were all
succinctly summed up by St. Paul centuries ago when he advised the Thessalonians to
abstain from all appearance of evil"); James D. Noseda, Comment, Limiting Off-Bench
Expression: Striking a Balance Between Accountability and Independence, 36 DEPAUL L.
REV. 519, 523 (1987) ("Canon 2's concern with the 'appearance of impropriety' serves as
the ultimate standard by which all off-bench activities are gauged.").
53. See Mosley v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 102 P.3d 555, 560 (Nev.
2004) (employing the "objective reasonable person standard" in finding a violation of
Canon 2B); Gallagher, 951 P.2d at 714 (finding judge's use of official stationery would
cause an objective reasonable observer to conclude that the judge was lending the
prestige of office to advance private interests); In re Chaisson, 549 So. 2d 259, 263 (La.
1989) ("The proper test of whether Judge Chaisson's actions gave the appearance of
impropriety is an objective one: whether a reasonable person would be justified in
suspecting that Judge Chaisson lent 'the prestige of his office to advance the private
interest' . . . of [another].") (citing In re Foster, 318 A.2d 523, 533 (Md. 1974)); cf
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. [5] (2007) ("The test for appearance of
impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that
the judge violated this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the
judge's honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.").
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determination, the hypothetical objective, reasonable, thoughtful
observer will not suffer from hypersensitivity or an unduly suspicious
nature, will ignore trivial risks of the abuse of the prestige of office, and
will be assumed to know and understand all relevant facts and
circumstances surrounding the letter.54
C. Application of the Test
1. Permissible Personal Uses of Judicial Stationery
Judges have long used official stationery to communicate with
relatives and friends regarding family, social, political, literary, and other
non-official matters.55  In addition to being utilized for unofficial
correspondence with family and friends, court stationery has been found
properly employed to arrange non-fund-raising social functions among
judges and lawyers.56 Personal "thank you" notes on judicial letterhead
54. See In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1990) ("An objective standard is
essential when the question is how things appear to the well-informed, thoughtful
observer rather than to a hypersensitive or unduly suspicious person.... A reasonable
observer is unconcerned about trivial risks .. "); United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d
279, 287 (4th Cir. 1998) (describing a reasonable observer as one not concerned about a
trivial risk that a judge may be biased); In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 584 (Pa. 1992)
("[R]easonable citizens require more than vague conjectures and subtle innuendo before
they will entertain suspicions of judicial misconduct or ascribe the 'appearance of
impropriety' to ambiguous facts and circumstances."); Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 949, 956 (1996) ("The leading view is
that a court should review judicial behavior by its appearance to a reasonable person
following review of the totality of the circumstances.").
55. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Canon Sheehan (April 1, 1911),
in HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE: THE LETTERS OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES AND CANON PATRICK AUGUSTINE SHEEHAN, 40-41 (David H. Burton ed., 1976)
(letter on Supreme Court stationery in which Justice Holmes comments upon the exploits
of former classmates, family matters, and loneliness); Letter from William H. Taft to
Solicitor General James A. Beck (Aug. 29, 1924) (letter on Supreme Court stationery in
which Justice Taft discusses books about Erasmus and Cleopatra) (copy on file with
author); Letters from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lady Clare Castletown (September 5,
1896 and October 7, 1896), in John S. Monagan, The Grand Panjandrum: Mellow Years
of Justice Holmes, 1998 SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY YEARBOOK 26, 27-29
(letters on Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court stationery in which then Massachusetts
Supreme Court Justice Holmes discusses family, speeches, and feelings of isolation);
Letter from Harry A. Blackman to Harold Hongju Koh (July 22, 1986), in Harold Hongju
Koh, Standing Together, 15 LAW & SEX. 1, 2 (2006) (letter on Supreme Court stationery
congratulating a former law clerk on becoming a parent); see also letters cited supra note
12; Tex. Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 137 (1990), available at http://courts.state.tx.us/
judethics/131-140.htm (permitting judicial letterhead for personal and social
correspondence so long as it does not give the appearance of misusing judicial prestige).
56. Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 86-15 (1986), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs-orgs/pos-ethics/?fa=pos-ethics.dispopin&mode=86
15 ("It is proper for a judge to use official stationery to arrange social functions between
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have been approved so long as there is no indication that a personal
advantage is sought. For example, in In re Thibodeaux,57 the court found
nothing improper about a judge writing a letter on judicial stationery to
the manager of a casino thanking the manager for the manner in which
the judge's wedding reception was handled.58 Similarly, a letter of
congratulations, at least where the letter does not amount to a political
endorsement or an attempt to curry favor with voters, does not constitute
misuse of the prestige of judicial office. 5 9 The Pennsylvania Conference
of State Court Trial Judges Judicial Ethics Committee has advised that a
judge may send a letter on official stationery to members of the judiciary
together with a complimentary copy of a book authored by the judge.6 °
Unless a motive other than enhancement of public confidence in the
judiciary is involved, a press release extolling a judge's law-related
accomplishments or activities is appropriately presented on court
stationery.6' In addition, the use of judicial letterhead does not implicate
judges since such use cannot exploit the judicial position."); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on
Judicial Ethics Op. 99-141 (1999), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/
judicialethics/opinions/99-141_.htm (approving judge's use of official stationery to
inform fellow law school alumni of upcoming law school non-fund-raising events
provided the letter is marked "personal and unofficial.").
57. In re Thibodeaux, 737 So. 2d 1284 (La. 1999).
58. Id.; see also Letter from Hugo Black to Jerome A. Cooper (May 10, 1968), in
LETTERS OF MR. JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK TO JEROME A. COOPER, supra note 12, pages
unnumbered (letter on Supreme Court stationery in which Justice Black thanks a former
law clerk for hosting a dinner party). Retired judges also have used court letterhead for
"thank-you" notes. See, e.g., Letter from Sandra Day O'Conner to Vanessa Ruiz (March
7, 2006), in COUNTER BALANCE (Nat. Assoc. of Women Judges) Spring 2006, at 13 (letter
on Supreme Court stationery thanking the National Association of Women Judges for
hosting a reception and establishing a scholarship in Justice O'Conner's name); cf N.Y.
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 99-54 (1999), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/99-54_.htm (approving a judge's note
on court stationery marked "Personal, Unofficial & Confidential" thanking a nursing
home director for care given to the judge's mother).
59. Nev. Standing Comm. on Judicial Ethics and Election Practices Op. JE 03-002
(2003), available at http://www.judicial.state.nv.us/je030023new.htm (observing that a
letter of congratulations on court stationery to successful judicial candidates "would
appear to be appropriate as a matter of collegiality"); Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm. Op.
00-09 (2000), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs-orgs/posethics/
?fa=posethics.dispopin&mode=0009 (acknowledging that a congratulatory letter to a
person achieving a scouting rank does not lend the prestige of office to advance private
interests). But see In re Berkhimer, 877 A.2d 579 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Dis. 2005) (characterizing
a congratulatory note to every constituent mentioned in a local newspaper as a thinly
veiled attempt to improve re-election prospects and a misuse of the prestige of office for
personal gain).
60. Pa. Conference of State Trial Judges Judicial Ethics Comm. Informal Op. 4/20/4
(2004), available at http://origin-www.courts.state.pa.us/ethics/digests.htm.
61. Cf NEV. SuP. CT. R. 7(14) (2007) ("If not done in furtherance of a re-election
effort, a Court member may, however, publicize his individual Court activities through
releases prepared on his own official Court stationery with the assistance of his personal
secretary and law clerks.").
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abuse of prestige concerns where the judge's official position is
legitimately and inextricably intertwined with the underlying purpose of
the correspondence. For example, it is natural and expected that a judge
would use court stationery in applying for a new judicial office 62 or a law
school teaching position.63 In all of these permitted, or at least tolerated,
private uses of official stationery, the risk of the ordinary reasonable
person viewing the judge's choice of stationery as an abuse of office is
considered trivial or nonexistent.
Most personal uses of official stationery, however, involve more
than a trivial or insignificant risk that the public will view the stationery
as a means of injecting judicial prestige into a private matter. There is a
consensus among the jurisdictions that court letterhead may not be used
for personal financial matters, private business dealings, discharging
parental responsibilities, private disputes, political activities, charitable
endeavors, or similar purposes.64  This consensus, however, has not
thwarted the reoccurring misuse of judicial stationery to obtain a private
advantage. While it is difficult to precisely identify the reasons judges
engage in activities detrimental to public confidence in the judiciary,6 5
repeated misuse of judicial stationery seems to occur for two reasons.
First, some judges refuse to accept the fact that the prestige and respect
that comes with their public office cannot be used to add credibility to
the positions they espouse in their private lives.66 Second, some judges
are simply oblivious to how their personal letter on official stationery
62. Cf. Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 87-01 (1987), available at
http://www.supremecourt.az.gov/ethics/ethicsopinions/87-01.pdf (noting that the private
interests referred to in Canon 2B do not include interests involved in the judicial selection
process); Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 2005-1 (2005), available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/2005-1n.html (concluding that a judge may write a
letter of recommendation on court stationery to a judicial nominating commission on
behalf of a candidate for a judicial position).
63. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 98-67 (1998), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/judicialethics/opinions/98-67-.htm (permitting a judge to
apply for a law school teaching position on judicial letterhead because "the fact that the
applicant is a judge would normally and properly be disclosed as part of the application
process .... ).
64. See infra Part III.C.2.
65. See Steven Lubet, Stupid Judge Tricks, 41 S. TEX. L. REv. 1301, 1310 (2000)
(suggesting that judges misbehave due to an over-active sense of entitlement).
66. See e.g. In re Di Loreto, Public Admonishment (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial
Conduct June 13, 2006), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdm/Di%20Loreto%20
D&O%206-13-06.pdf (disciplining judge for using judicial stationery in a private dispute
and rejecting the same defense the judge had unsuccessfully interposed in a prior
disciplinary action for the same conduct); In re Nesbitt, Determination (N.Y. State
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct June 21, 2002), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/
DeterminationsiN/Nesbitt.htm (noting judge's admission that his use of court letterhead
"was intended to influence the recipient to give particular attention to his views simply
because of respondent's judicial status.").
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looks to the ordinary, reasonable non-judge.
67
2. Improper Uses of Judicial Stationery
a. Personal Financial Matters
The power and prestige of office do not insulate judges from the
problems incident to daily living, including dealing with insurance
agents, taxing bodies, bank officials, repair persons, sales persons, utility
companies, and a multitude of others. Correspondence concerning
everyday matters should be confined to personal stationery especially
when the correspondence involves a complaint or demand that otherwise
could be interpreted as suggesting the recipient accede to a position taken
by the judge. In In re Gallagher,68 the court had no difficulty
determining that a judge was lending the prestige of office to advance his
private financial interests by authoring the following communications on
official court stationery:
* A letter to an insurance company requesting that late
charges be waived;
* A letter to a magazine publisher complaining about a
"grossly misleading and deceptive" promotion;
* A note contesting a doctor's bill;
* A letter to a golf magazine contending the publisher failed
to honor a two-for-one subscription offer;
* Letters to a travel agent and automobile rental company
complaining that the cost of a rental car had doubled.69
In a similar vein, a California judge was disciplined in part for
sending letters on court stationery to an insurance company regarding a
67. Compare In re Horowitz, Answer to Formal Complaint (N.Y. State Comm'n on
Judicial Conduct July 16, 2007), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Detenninations/
H!Horowitz.lawrence.stip%20exhibit%202.pdf (defending the use of judicial stationery
for personal financial matters on the basis that the judge did not believe anyone would
perceive he was seeking an advantage because the stationery was marked "personal and
unofficial") and Claire Luna, Judge Used His Court's Facilities to Intimidate Her,
Tenant Alleges: A State Commission is Investigating O.C. Judge John M. Watson, Who
Says No Rules Were Broken, L.A. TIMES, Aug.15, 2004, at B.1 (quoting a tenant's lawyer
as stating, "Sending something to tenants on court stationery is scary.... It gives tenants
the impression that he [the judge] can bring the whole legal system against them if they
complain too much.").
68. In re Gallagher, 951 P.2d 705 (Or. 1998).
69. Id. at 710-12. Ninety-five percent of the judge's personal business letters went
out on judicial stationery. Id. at 710; see also In re Horowitz, Determination (N.Y. State
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct July 16, 2007), available at http://www.scjs.state.ny.us/
Determinations/HHorowitz,_lawrence.htm (describing charge against judge for using
judicial letterhead in a dispute with a telephone company).
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claim arising from a burglary at the judge's home, an airline company
complaining about flight delays, and a book publisher disputing a bill.
70
Another judge was publicly admonished for, among other things, writing
two letters on judicial stationery to a collection agency regarding a claim
against a member of the judge's family.7 1  The same sanction was
imposed upon another judge for sending a letter on official stationery to a
bank, which made a "special request" to convert an existing line of credit
from "unsecured" to "secured" in connection with the refinancing of the
judge's home.72
Taking the same restrictive approach, ethics advisory committees
have cautioned judges against using official stationery to inquire about
"personal or real property assessments, 7 3 license or automobile
registrations, 7 4  health insurance processing procedures,7 5  utility
services,76 automobile defects, 77 and discounts. 78 One state's advisory
committee has taken a less restrictive view of the use of official
letterhead for complaint or demand letters. The Missouri Commission
on Retirement, Removal and Discipline has determined that a judge is
not automatically prohibited from using court stationery to write about a
defective automobile, poor telephone service or an investment
portfolio. 79 The Missouri Commission's opinion is based upon In re
Buford.80 In that case Judge Buford sent a letter on official stationery to
an insurance adjustor requesting $2,500 plus "specials" to settle a claim
70. In re Hyde, Public Censure (Cal. Comrnm'n on Judicial Performance May 14,
1996), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensure/Hyde%20Censure%2005-14-96.pdf.
71. In re Stoll, Public Admonishment (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial Performance June
3, 1996), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdm/Stoll%206-96.pdf.
72. In re Coates, Public Admonishment (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial Performance
April 12, 2000), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdm/Coates/2004-12-00.pdf.




75. Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges Op. 96-14 (1996),
available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/eacopinions/
ninet6/96-14.html (finding it improper to send a complaint on official stationery to the
agency administering the judge's health insurance); Utah Judicial Ethics Advisory
Comm. Informal Op. 99-3 (1999), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/
ethadv/ethics-opinions/1999/99-3.htm (disapproving use of judicial letterhead for any
communication with an insurance company).




78. Utah Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Informal Op. 99-3 (1999), available at
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/ethadv/ethics-opinions/1999/99-3.htm.
79. Mo. Comm'n on Ret., Removal and Discipline Op. 39 (1980).
80. In re Buford, 577 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1979).
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
arising from an automobile collision.8' The Missouri Supreme Court
determined that the judge's use of court letterhead did not violate any
rule of judicial conduct because the adjuster knew the claimant was a
judge and testified that "the letter could have been written on any kind of
stationery as far as he [the adjuster] was concerned., 82  Most
jurisdictions reject the permissive approach taken in Missouri and for all
practical purposes presume that judicial prestige is misused whenever
official stationery is used for personal financial matters, including
matters involving insurance claims or inquiries. 83  In addition, when
given the opportunity to apply the Buford holding in a subsequent
judicial disciplinary matter, the Missouri Supreme Court declined to do
so stating that Buford would be limited to its facts.84
b. Business Dealings
Codes of judicial conduct severely limit a judge's business
involvement because of the inherent danger that active or public
association with a commercial enterprise will exploit, or at least appear
to exploit, the prestige of judicial office. 85 The use of judicial stationery
for private business communications surely increases the danger that the
recipient of the communication will conclude that the judge is trading
official prestige for a private economic advantage. Such a result is
inescapable for instance when a part-time judge uses judicial stationery
in a law practice, 86 when a judge on senior status advertises private
mediation services on court letterhead,87 or when a justice of the peace
uses stationery with an official title and court designation in conducting a
debt collection business.88 The same conclusion is required where a
81. Id. at 830.
82. Id.
83. For disciplinary and advisory opinions disapproving the use of official stationery
in private insurance matters, see supra notes 68, 70, and 75.
84. In re Hill, 8 S.W.3d 578, 582 (Mo. 2000).
85. See Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 06-01 (2006), available at http://www.ija.org/
ethicsop/opinions/06-01.htm (citing JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND
ETHICs 7.14, at 228 (3d ed. 2000)).
86. In re Vasser, 382 A.2d 1114, 1116-17 (N.J. 1978) (declaring such conduct
violates Canons 1 and 2 of the 1972 Model Code and Canon 31 of the 1924 Canons); cf
In re Laatsch, 727 N.W.2d 488, 491 (Wis. 2007) (disciplining a judge in part for
identifying himself as a municipal court judge in a Yellow Pages advertisement for his
private law practice); Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 03-06 (2003), available
at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/ethics-opinions/03-06.pdf (advising that an
attorney serving as a pro tempore judge cannot list his or her judicial title on law office
stationery).
87. Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges Op. 92-30 (1992),
available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/
ninet2/92-30.html.
88. In re Josey, 292 S.E.2d 59, 60 (Ga. 1982) (describing a judge's use of what
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judge, in an effort to build customer good will, provides a letter on
judicial stationery in support of an application to reinstate the gun permit
of a person who patronizes the judge's sporting goods store. 89 And all
things considered, it is not advisable to order marijuana through the mail
using judicial stationery. 90
Managing real estate investments is a common business venture that
has given judges an opportunity to misuse court stationery. A California
judge was publicly admonished for using court staff, equipment, and
supplies in the management of two rental properties owned by the
judge.9 1 Of the approximately 40 letters and legal notices prepared by
the judge's clerk in connection with the properties, three letters to tenants
and one letter to the Los Angles Housing Authority appeared on
chambers letterhead.92 Court envelopes were used on eight occasions. 93
A New York judge was disciplined, in part, because she not only sent a
letter on judicial stationery complaining about the cost of work
performed on an apartment building she managed for her father, but also
used court envelopes to send letters to tenants advising that the
building's water source was contaminated and "that they should obtain
water from another source or vacate the premises. 94
The Illinois Courts Commission in In re Rosenblum95 reached a
contrary conclusion finding that a judge's use of court stationery in a
landlord-tenant dispute was not shown by clear and convincing evidence
to be an attempt to exploit the judicial office.9 6 The Commission relied
in part on the fact that the judge took steps to indicate the unofficial
nature of the correspondence by including the disclaimer, "Not official
appeared to be an official court notice in a private attempt to collect a debt as
"reprehensible"); In re Peeples, 374 S.E.2d 674, 677 (S.C. 1988) (finding letter on
judicial stationery demanding that the recipient commence $300 monthly payments to the
judge's friend allows for no interpretation other than judicial prestige is being used for
private debt collection purposes).
89. In re Freeman, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct Nov. 8,
1991), available at http://scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/F/Freeman.htm.
90. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1089 n.l (9th Cir. 2003) (describing
the envelope in which a judge sent payment for marijuana as "carry[ing] the printed
official heading, 'Philip Marquardt, Superior Court Judge, Phoenix Arizona').
91. In re Watson, Public Admonishment (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial Performance
Feb. 21, 2006), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdm/Watson%20%202-21-06.pdf.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. In re Tyler, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct May 1,
1989), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/T/Fyler.htm (describing
other misconduct upon which the judge's removal was based to include presiding over a
case in which the judge's husband was the complaining witness and striking a defendant
in the face with a telephone book).
95. In re Rosenblum, 3 Il1. Cts. Comm'n 9 (July 29, 1993).
96. Id. at 30.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
correspondence," at the top of the letter and typing "X's" through the
pre-printed portion of the letterhead containing the court name, court
seal, and judge's judicial title.97  Assuming modifications to official
letterhead, similar to the type utilized in Rosenblum, are sufficient to
eliminate the possibility that a letter will be viewed as an official court
act, the modifications in no way change the fact that the judge has
interjected the official prestige of his or her public office into a private
matter. As recognized by the Florida Committee on Standards of
Conduct Governing Judges, "a complaint on stationery which identifies
the sender as a judge is tantamount to making a complaint while wearing
judicial robes." 98  Thus, modifying court stationery by striking court
designations or including the phrase "personal and unofficial" generally
will be deemed irrelevant to the issue of whether a judge has misused the
prestige of office, in business, financial, political, charitable, or other
personal matters or disputes. 99
c. Parental Responsibilities
Judges are consistently reminded that using official stationery to
discharge parental responsibilities improperly blurs the distinction
between the public and powerful role of judicial officer and the private
and unfortunately less prestigious role of parent or guardian.'00 Although
the oath of office does not require a judge to forfeit parental rights and
97. Id. at 12, 19, 33.
98. Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges Op. 81-08 (1981),
available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/
eightyl/81-08.html.
99. See In re Di Loreto, Public Admonishment (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial
Performance June 13, 2006), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/PubAdm/Di%20
Loreto%20D&O%206-13-06.pdf (finding "personal" designation on chambers stationery
irrelevant given that the stationery was used in a private dispute); In re Nesbitt,
Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct June 21, 2002), available at
http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/N/Nesbitt.htm (including phrase "personal
and unofficial" on court stationery does not diminish the fact that the judge interjected
judicial status into a private matter); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 99-
155 (1999), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/99-155_.htm
(disapproving the usc of court letterhead in re-election campaign even if marked
"personal and unofficial"). Using a "personal" or "personal and unofficial" designation
on official stationery used for letters of reference or recommendation is discussed infra
Part IV.
100. See, e.g., In re Hamed, 357 N.W.2d 300, 303 (Iowa 1984) (Schultz, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that the magistrate's personal interest as a
parent contributed to her lack of judicial judgment); cf In re Yaccarino, 502 A.2d 3, 24
(N.J. 1985) ("Judges are subject to the same human emotions as other parents and are
entitled, as parents, to respond to a felt unjust abuse of their children. But judges must
always be conscious that they not blur the line between parent and judge."); see also
sources cited infra notes 101-11.
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responsibilities,' °  maternal and paternal instincts simply do not excuse a
deviation from the rules established by a code of judicial conduct.1
0 2
Foremost among the prohibited parental uses of official letterhead is
communicating with another judge concerning a son or daughter's
pending or impending criminal, civil, or traffic matter. 10 3 Even in the
absence of a specific request for special consideration, a letter from one
judge to another on behalf of the judge's offspring, or anyone else for
that matter, "necessarily taints the proceeding with favoritism,"'0 4 or at
least the appearance of favoritism. The same is true when a judge uses
official stationery to communicate with clerks, lawyers, and other non-
judicial participants in litigation involving the judge's child.'0 5
Another reoccurring issue for parent-judges is the use of official
stationery in communicating with school officials. In In re Nesbitt,1°6 a
101. See I11. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 04-01 (2004), available at http://www.ija.org/
ethicsop/opinions/04-0 1.htm ("Becoming a judge does not require the judge to abdicate
his or her parental authority and responsibility."); In re Sharlow, Determination (N.Y.
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct Mar. 22, 2005), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/
Determinations/S/Sharlow.htm (Ciardullo, J., dissenting) ("A judge does not lose his or
her rights and responsibilities as a parent simply because he or she holds judicial
office.").
102. See In re Edwards 492 N.E.2d 124, 124 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986) ("'[P]aternal
instincts' do not justify a departure from the standards expected of the judiciary."); see
also In re Van Rider, 715 N.E.2d 402, 404 (Ind. 1999) (observing that a judge's parental
concern about a son's safety after an arrest does not excuse a violation of the judicial
code); Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Brown, 761 So. 2d 182, 184 (Miss. 2000)
(reminding judges that acting as a concerned parent is no defense to a violation of Canon
2).
103. In re Harried, 357 N.W.2d 300 (Iowa 1984) (disciplining magistrate for
corresponding on official stationery with the magistrate presiding over her minor
daughter's traffic citation); In re Sharlow, Determination, (N.Y. State Comm'n on
Judicial Conduct Mar. 22, 2005), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/
Determinations/S/Sharlow.htm (disciplining judge for corresponding on court letterhead
with the judge presiding over his son's trespass case); Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm. Op.
86-15 (1986), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs-orgs/posethics/
?fa=pos-ethics.dispopin&mode=8615 (prohibiting correspondence on official stationery
with a court in another jurisdiction regarding a judge's family member's pending matter).
104. In re Cipolla, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 1,
2002), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/C/Cipolla.htm (citing In
re Edwards, 492 N.E.2d 124 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1986)).
105. Cf In re Magill, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 6,
2004), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/M/Magill.htm
(concluding that judge interjected judicial prestige into his wife and daughter's case by
delivering court file together with his official business card to the clerk of the judge
handling the matter); Darlene Ricker, A Car Crash Leads to Ethics Clash: Santa Barbara
Firms Shun Lawyer Who Filed Suit Against Son of Protesting Judge, 80 A.B.A. J. 30
(1994) (discussing judge's letter on court stationery to law firm suing the judge's son
complaining that if a settlement exceeded insurance policy limits the judge would
"probably be asked to foot the bill").
106. In re Nesbitt, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct June 21,
2002), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/N/Nesbitt.htm.
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judge sent a letter to a community college challenging the legal
sufficiency of the procedures utilized in expelling the judge's son. The
New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct determined that the
"undeniable impact" of the court stationery was to improperly encourage
the school to give special attention to the opinion of the letter's author
because of the prestige of his judicial office. 0 7 Similarly, in In re
Mosley, 10 8 a judge violated Canon 2B by sending a letter on court
stationery to a school principal requesting that the mother of the judge's
son be barred from visiting the son at school. 10 9 In contrast, the use of
plain stationery by a parent-judge is a strong indicator that the prestige of
judicial office is not being interjected into a school matter even where the
parent's judicial status is mentioned in the letter and the judge requests
certain action be taken regarding the child." 0
Judicial stationery also must be avoided in undertaking more
pleasant parental tasks like assisting a child in applying for a
scholarship."' Certainly the judge's occupation, if requested, can be
identified in the scholarship application but the cover letter and other
supporting documentation accompanying the application should not
appear on court stationery.' 12
d. Private Disputes
Judges have an ethical duty to take appropriate action, which may
include notifying a disciplinary authority, upon receiving information
107. Id.; see also In re Moynihan, Stipulation, Agreement and Order (Wash. Comm'n
on Judicial Conduct Oct. 1, 1993), available at http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/CJCActivity/
publicactions_1993.htm (disciplining judge for sending a letter and affidavit on judicial
letterhead to the American Schools of Correspondence on behalf of a child living with the
judge).
108. In re Mosley, 102 P.3d 555 (Nev. 2004).
109. Id. at 559.
110. See Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 04-01 (2004), available at http://www.ija.org/
ethicsop/opinions/04-01.htm (determining that a letter on plain stationery to a school
requesting that a neutral be appointed to resolve disciplinary issues involving the judge's
son was not a misuse of the prestige of office even though the letter mentioned the
judge's judicial status). But see In re Samay, 764 A.2d 398 (N.J. 2001). In Samay, the
judge received a letter from his child's school threatening legal action if tuition was not
paid. The judge wrote back on personal stationery characterizing the school's collection
letter as "arrogant," overbearing," "totally unwarranted," "egregiously offensive,"
"unconscionable," "ludicrous," "inappropriate," "in bad taste," "blatantly ignorant," and
containing "blatant sixth grade errors." Id. at 402-03. The New Jersey Supreme Court
held that by indicating his judicial status in the signature line of the letter, the judge
violated Canons 1, 2A, and 2B of the New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct. Id. at 407.
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that a judge or lawyer has engaged in certain prohibited conduct. 1 3 In
rare circumstances, a judge may have a duty to report criminal activity of
a non-lawyer disclosed during a court proceeding." 4 Correspondence
concerning these official responsibilities certainly can be made on
judicial stationery.' 15  Similarly, a judge who reasonably perceives a
threat arising out of his or her official duties or status is entitled to
contact investigative or prosecutorial authorities on official court
stationery. 1 However, if a judge wishes to lodge a complaint against an
individual based solely on what the judge has witnessed or suffered as a
private citizen, the complaint should be made on private stationery." 7
For some judges separating the personal from the official has proven to
be a difficult task.
In In re Meadows,"8 a driver cut in front of a judge waiting her turn
at a gas pump. After using government resources to learn the identity of
the driver, the judge sent a letter on court stationery to law enforcement
officials advising that although she did not want the motorist charged
with negligent driving, she would disqualify herself from future traffic
matters involving the offender. 119 The Washington Commission on
Judicial Conduct found that because courts, not law enforcement
agencies, process recusals, the letter was obviously sent to advance the
judge's private rather than judicial interests. 120 In another disciplinary
113. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D(1)-(2) (1990); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.15 (2007).
114. 11. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 02-01 (2002), available at http://www.ija.org/
ethicsop/opinions/02-01.htm (observing that in rare circumstances a judge's failure to
report criminal activity might violate the judge's duty to promote public confidence in the
judiciary); Pa. Conference of State Trial Judges Judicial Ethics Comm. Formal Op. 99-2
(1999), available at http://origin-www.courts.state.pa.us/ethics/formal.htm (suggesting
that in obvious and egregious cases a judge should consider the possibility that his or her
failure to report a crime may undermine confidence in the integrity of the judiciary).
115. Md. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 2004-07 (2004), available at
http://mdcourts.gov/ethics/pdfs/2004-07.pdf (concluding that a judge may use court
stationery to report criminal activity disclosed during the course ofjudicial proceedings).
116. Cf. Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 259 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that where
a judge reasonably perceives a threat arising out of the judge's adjudicatory conduct, the
judge's response, whether a letter on court stationery to a prosecutor or a telephone call to
the Marshall's office, is a judicial act).
117. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoague, 725 N.E.2d 1108, 1110 (Ohio
2000) ("A judge who observes a crime outside the courtroom has only the power of an
ordinary citizen.").
118. In re Meadows, Stipulation, Agreement and Order of Admonishment (Wash.
Comm'n on Judicial Conduct Dec. 7, 2001), available at http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/
CJC_.Activity/publicactions_2001 .htm.
119. Id.
120. Id.; see also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoague, 725 N.E.2d 1108, 1110
(Ohio 2000) (judge sent intimidating letter on court stationery to a reckless driver in an
attempt to compel the driver to appear in court to receive a personal reprimand from the
judge).
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action, a judge, in what might appear on its face to be an official act,
filed a complaint on court stationery claiming that a deputy sheriff took a
bribe. 12' After reviewing the matter, however, the Texas Commission on
Judicial Conduct determined in fact that transmittal of the letter was a
personal act because the deputy sheriff was opposing the judge in an
election for justice of the peace and the judge offered to withdraw the
complaint if the deputy withdrew his candidacy.1
22
Employing judicial stationery to compel compliance with a judge's
demand as a private citizen is likewise forbidden. 123 Thus, sending a
letter on court stationery directing a police officer to appear in court to
explain the officer's contemptuous conduct in failing to lower the
volume of a police radio while the judge was trying to eat lunch
warranted a public reprimand. 124  Another judge, after receiving
information from a friend that a musical group was conducting loud and
disturbing outdoor band practices, improperly sent a letter on official
stationery advising the musicians that it was "an order of this court" that
the band only practice "within the confines of your home with windows
and doors closed."'' 25 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals found
that a judge's use of court stationery to transmit a diatribe of disparaging
and offensive comments directed at attorneys, including a warning that
unfounded complaints against judges might result in retaliation, only
could be viewed as an unambiguous attempt to cloak a personal vendetta
with the prestige of judicial authority.
26
If a private dispute leads to litigation, the judge, as a private litigant,
may not use court stationery to communicate with the judge assigned to
the case, counsel, court clerks, or anyone else connected with the
litigation. 27  In the not so distant past, a plaintiff-judge publicly
apologized for using court stationery to make a settlement demand in a
121. In re Christian, Voluntary Agreement to Resign (Tex. Comm'n on Judicial
Conduct Dec. 5, 2001).
122. Id.
123. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoague, 725 N.E.2d 1108, 1110 (Ohio
2000) (suspending judge for sending an intimidating letter on court stationery to a
reckless driver in an attempt to compel the driver to appear in court to receive a personal
reprimand from the judge).
124. In re Muszynski, 471 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1985).
125. In re Glover, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct Oct. 11,
2005), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/G/Glover.htm.
126. In re Mogil, 673 N.E.2d 896 (N.Y. 1996).
127. In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 822 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Alaska 1991)
(describing how a judge in his private capacity as a corporate officer used chambers
stationery to convey settlement materials to counsel for the opposing party). Nor should
a judge use court stationery to survey lawyers to determine whether the judge has a
meritorious defamation action. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 00-07
(2000), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/00-07_.htm.
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The use of government issued judicial stationery for any type of
political activity is forbidden regardless of whether the letterhead is used
for the judge's own political purposes, 129 or the judge's efforts in support
of another's political endeavors. 30 Nor should this rule be circumvented
by designing campaign stationery in such a manner that permits it to be
128. Judge Murphy, Herald Lawyers Spar Over Letters' Publicity, BOSTON HERALD,
Jan. 7, 2006, at 4. Notwithstanding the apology, the Massachusetts Commission on
Judicial Conduct charged Judge Murphy with using court letterhead and envelopes to
communicate with the publisher of the Boston Herald regarding the judge's personal
litigation. In re Murphy, Formal Charges, Nos. 2006-9 and 2006-30 (Mass. Comm'n on
Judicial Conduct June 26, 2007), available at http://www.mass.gov/cjc/
murphy071007.pdf.
129. See In re Gallagher, 951 P.2d 705, 713 (Or. 1998) (finding misuse of court staff
and supplies, including stationery, for judge's re-election fund-raising event); In re
Cerbone, 812 N.E.2d 932, 933 (N.Y. 2004) (describing sanction previously imposed on
judge for using judicial letterhead in a private, political dispute); Fla. Comm. on
Standards of Conduct Governing Judges Op. 92-2 (1992), available at
http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/ninet2/92-
02.html (prohibiting "thank you" notes to campaign contributors on judicial stationery);
Pa. Conference of State Trial Judges Judicial Ethics Comm. Informal Op. 1/22/01 (2001),
available at http://origin-www.courts.state.pa.us/ethics/digests.htm (prohibiting "thank
you" notes to campaign contributors on judicial stationery); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on
Judicial Ethics Op. 99-155 (1999), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/
judicialethics/opinions/99-155_.htm (admonishing judges not to use court stationery in a
re-election campaign even if marked "personal and unofficial"); Texas Comm. on
Judicial Ethics Op. 137 (1990), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/judethics/131-
140.htn ("[Tihe use of official judicial letterhead for campaign purposes could give the
appearance that a judge candidate is attempting to exploit the judge's judicial position.");
Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 04-06 (2004), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/
programs orgs/pos ethics/index.cfrn?fa=pos-ethics.dispopin&mode=0406 (permitting
judges to send campaign "thank you" notes to family members but not on court
stationery); cf People v. Nathanson, 284 P.2d 975 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (upholding
indictment charging city councilman with misuse of government letterhead in bid for re-
election). But see Pa. Conference of State Trial Judges Judicial Ethics Comm. Informal
Op. 11/6/3 (2003), available at http://origin-www.courts.state.pa.us/ethics/digests.htm
("The judges of a judicial district who won retention may write a joint letter on judicial
stationery... thanking the members of a party political committee that helped them win
retention.").
130. In re Glickstein, 620 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1993) (sanctioning judge for writing a
letter to the editor on judicial stationery endorsing a fellow judge for retention); Ala.
Judicial Inquiry Comm'n Op. 00-755 (2000), available at http://www.alalinc.net/jic/
opinions/aoOO-755.htm (permitting judge to author political endorsement letter but not on
court stationery); Tenn. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 98-1 (1998), available at
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/opinions/ethics/PDF/98- 1.pdf (allowing judge to send private
letter to friends endorsing judicial candidate but only on personal stationery); cf Paulos
v. Breier, 371 F. Supp. 523, 527 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (interpreting rule prohibiting police
officers from using their office for political purposes to include a bar against the use of
police department stationery for a political endorsement).
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confused with official court stationery. 13 1  Surprisingly, a few
jurisdictions permit a judge to use "look-alike" official stationery in
political campaigns. The Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission
stated that a judge may use court stationery in a re-election campaign as
long as the judge pays for the stationery. 132 In West Virginia a judge
may not use court stationery, a facsimile of court stationery,134 or the
state seal on campaign letterhead,1 35 but apparently may use campaign
letterhead containing the judge's name and courthouse address.'
36
Notwithstanding the Georgia and West Virginia advisory opinions, there
is simply no justification for permitting facsimile stationery or any
stationery containing the judge's official address to be used for campaign
purposes. Including court designations or addresses on campaign
stationery hopelessly, needlessly, and inescapably confuses the official
with the private, the partisan with the non-partisan, and the political with
the non-political. Moreover, a courthouse address or telephone number
on campaign stationery improperly invites political contacts to the
judge's workplace. The use of official stationery or "look-alike"
stationery for political purposes misuses the prestige of judicial office
and creates an appearance of impropriety.
137
131. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n Op. 00-746 (2000), available at
http://www.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/aoOO-746.htm (cautioning that the state judicial seal
should not be included on campaign stationery because it would give the impression that
official stationery is being used for campaign purposes); Pa. Conference of State Trial
Judges Judicial Ethics Comm. Informal Op. 1/22/01 (2001), available at http://origin-
www.courts.state.pa.us/ethics/digests.htm (advising judges not to place a government
seal on campaign stationery or use official stationery for campaign purposes even if
purchased with private funds). But see TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.006 (Vernon 2007)
(permitting an "officeholder" to use a representation of the state seal in political
advertising); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. 17.08 (Vernon 2007) (providing that use of
the state seal by an "elected official" for a political purpose is not an improper
commercial or private use of the seal).
132. Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n Op. 55 (1984); see also S.C. Advisory
Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct Op. 3-1994 (1994), available at
http://www.sccourts.org/adv-opinion/displayadvopin.c fm?advOpinYR= 1994&advOpinN
0=3 (permitting judges who are candidates for "re-election" by the state legislature to use
court stationery for campaign correspondence with the legislators but suggesting that the
stationery be purchased with private funds).
133. W. Va. Judicial Investigation Comm'n Op. 7/26/88 (1988); W. Va. Judicial
Investigation Comm'n Op. 9/2/88 (1988).
134. W. Va. Judicial Investigation Comm'n Op. 9/23/96 (1996).
135. W. Va. Judicial Investigation Comm'n Op. 3/10/00 (2000).
136. W. Va. Judicial Investigation Comm'n Op. 7/26/88 (1988); W. Va. Judicial
Investigation Comm'n Op. 9/2/88 (1988).
137. Judicial Ethics Handbook, Part 12-850 (Judicial Education Center of New
Mexico 2004), available at http://jec.edu/resources/judicial-handbook/ethics/
ethicsl2.htm (judge may not mail campaign letters on judicial stationery even if the
stationery is paid for by the judge because the use of official stationery in a political
campaign creates an appearance of impropriety); Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n Advisory
[Vol. 112:2
2007] ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF JUDICIAL STATIONERY 497
f. Charitable Solicitations
As a general rule, judges may not, by any means, personally solicit
funds or other assistance on behalf of a charitable, civic, or other
organization. 38 This prohibition has been applied to preclude a judge
from using official stationery to solicit contributions for crime prevention
and law-day programs,139 items for a charity auction, 14 school supplies
for the homeless, 141 and funds from former law school classmates for a
gift to their alma mater. 142 This rule cannot be avoided by directing a
court administrator to send a solicitation letter on court stationery that
identifies the court but not the judges of the court.
14 3
Canon 4C(3)(b)(i) of the 1990 Model Code contains a limited
exception to the anti-solicitation rule by permitting a judge to "solicit
funds from other judges over whom the judge does not exercise
supervisory or appellate authority."' 144 Rule 3.7(A)(2) of the 2007 Model
Code adopts this exception and adds to it by also permitting judges to
solicit contributions from members of the judge's family. 45 At least two
Op. 00-746 (2000), available at http://www.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/aoOO-746.htm (use of
courthouse address and telephone number on campaign material itself creates the
appearance of impropriety).
138. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4C(3)(b)(i) (1990) (providing
that a judge "shall not personally participate in the solicitation of funds or other fund-
raising activities, except that a judge may solicit funds from other judges over whom the
judge does not exercise supervisory or appellate authority"); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 3.7(A)(2) (2007) (prohibiting a judge from soliciting contributions except
from family members and judges over whom the soliciting judge does not exercise
supervisory or appellate authority).
139. In re Thompson, 682 N.W.2d 477 (Mich. 2004); In re Thompson, Decision and
Recommendation for Order of Discipline (Mich. Judicial Tenure Comm'n May 10,
2004), available at http://jtc.courts.mi.gov/downloads/fc72.sign.d&r.pdf.
140. Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 99-07 (1999), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs.orgs/pos ethics/?fa=pos -ethics.dispopin&mode=99
07; see also Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n Op. 00-753 (2000), available at
http://www.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/aoOO-753.htm (prohibiting the use of the judicial title
or official stationery for civic or charitable fund-raising).
141. Pa. Conference of State Trial Judges Judicial Ethics Comm. Informal Op. 8/1/03
(2003), available at http://origin-www.courts.state.pa.us/ethics/digests.htm.
142. Kan. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel Op. JE-18 (1987), available at
http://www.kscourts.org/clerkct/JE 18.pdf.
143. Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 94-15 (1994), available at
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/ethics-Opinions/94- 1 5.pdf.
144. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4C(3)(b)(i) (1990).
145. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.7(A)(2) (2007); see also Wash. Ethics
Advisory Comm. Op. 06-07 (2006), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/
programs..orgs/pos-ethics/?fa=posethics.dispopin&mode=0607 (permitting a judge to
solicit funds for charitable purposes from family and friends who would never appear
before the judge); Mich. St. Bar Comm. on Prof I and Judicial Ethics Op. CI-641 (1981),
available at http://michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numbered-opinions/ci-64 1 .html
(permitting a judge to solicit contributions from other judges and family members for the
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jurisdictions permit a judge to solicit non-judges if the amount solicited
is de minimis and the person solicited is not an attorney or otherwise
likely to appear before the judge. 146 But even in jurisdictions allowing
limited judicial solicitations, a solicitation should not be made using
official stationery. 147 A provision has been added to the 2007 Model
Code designed to address the problem of using court property in support
of ajudge's extrajudicial activities.148 Rule 3.1 specifically prohibits the
use of "court premises, staff, stationery, equipment, or other resources"
for solicitations or any other activity on behalf of an educational,
religious, charitable, fraternal or civic organization.
149
IV. References and Recommendations
In the context of the proper and improper use of the prestige of
judicial office, letters of reference and recommendation present a special
problem. On one hand, writing a letter to assist another in obtaining a
personal advantage such as a job, scholarship, school admission, or bar
admission can be construed as lending the prestige of office to advance
private interests. On the other hand, respected professionals in every
walk of life are called upon, and indeed expected, to convey relevant
knowledge about persons seeking employment, educational, and other
opportunities. 150  Additionally, to prohibit a judge from providing a
"Muscular Dystrophy Run").
146. R.I. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4C(3)(b) cmt. (2007). Specifically, the
comment provides:
Canon 4 should not be read as proscribing participation in de minimis fund-
raising activities so long as a judge is careful to avoid using the prestige of the
office in the activity. Thus, e.g., a judge may pass the collection basket during
services at church, may ask friends and neighbors to buy tickets to a pancake
breakfast for a neighborhood center and may cook pancakes at the event, but
may not personally ask attorneys and others who are likely to appear before the
judge to buy tickets to it.
Id.; WIS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT SCR 60.05(3)(c)2.d cmt. (2006) (same).
147. Cf Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 06-07 (2006), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs-orgs/pos-ethics/?fa=pos-ethics.dispopin&mode=06
07 (permitting the solicitation of family and friends but only if the judge's title is not used
in the solicitation).
148. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.1 (E) (2007).
149. Id. Rule 1.3 excepts incidental use of court resources for extrajudicial activities
concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. Id.
150. N.M. Judicial Advisory Comm. Op. 1990-3 (1990) (describing a
recommendation request received by a judge as "no different than a request made to any
doctor, lawyer, business man or respected citizen for information of value to a potential
employer or a scholastic institution"); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 88-
10 (1988), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/88-10-.pdf
("[T]he judge not only is not prohibited from writing an appropriate [recommendation]
letter, but is expected to write such a letter, and is encouraged to do so."); see also Ind.
Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications Op. 3-88 (1988), available at http://www.in.gov/
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recommendation letter or acting as a reference would unduly and unfairly
disadvantage clerks, attorneys, and others working directly for a judge.'5 '
Professional and practical considerations prevailed and commentary was
included in the 1990 Model Code declaring that "a judge may, based on
the judge's personal knowledge, serve as a reference or provide a letter
of recommendation" without violating the prohibition against lending the
prestige of office to advance the private interests of others. 152  The
rationale for permitting judicial recommendations is that as long as a
recommendation letter is based on the judge's first-hand knowledge, the
letter transfers that personal knowledge and not the prestige of judicial
office. 153 Based upon the Commentary to Canon 2B of the 1990 Model
Code, jurisdictions uniformly permit judges to act as references and
provide letters of recommendation. 
54
judiciary/jud-qual/docs/adops/3-88.pdf ("So customary is the practice of
recommendations within a profession that, when made by a judge, it is less a function of
the judicial position than it is of the judge's position within the legal community at
large."); Md. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 1977-05 (1977), available at
http://mdcourts.gov/ethics/pdfs/1977-05.pdf ("It is a prerequisite to the proper operation
of many institutions that recommendations be received from a cross section of the
population and there is no reason to exclude judges."); Mo. Comm'n on Ret., Removal
and Discipline Op. 133 (undated) ("[A] recommendation given in the normal course of
application to an educational institution or for employment is something which is done in
ordinary daily situations and does not indicate any impropriety or appearance of
impropriety.").
151. Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 2007-06 (2007), available at
http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2007/2007-
06.html ("When an attorney's employment is as a staff attorney for a judge, the judge is
uniquely qualified to comment on the staff attorney's work performance. If the judge
were unable to attest to the staff attorney's work performance, it is unclear who would.").
152. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B cmt. (1990); see also LISA L.
MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 14 (1992) ("The Committee
[that drafted the 1990 Model Code] was aware that judges commonly feel they should be
permitted to provide a reference for a former law clerk or other employee of the judge, or
for a family friend, so long as the reference is based on the judge's knowledge about the
referent.").
153. See Cynthia Gray, Recommendations by Judges 13 (Am. Judicature Soc'y 1996)
(observing that the requirement that a judge possess personal knowledge of the person
being recommended "lessens any grounds for reasonable suspicion that the prestige of
judicial office, rather than the evaluation of the individual judge, is being used to support
the personal interests of the subject of the recommendation"). The author is indebted to
Ms. Gray for the research and analysis presented in Recommendations by Judges.
154. Id. at 2 ("However, in general, advisory committees allow a judge to furnish a
letter of recommendation or act as a reference for a person seeking employment,
admission to an educational institution or the bar, or similar situations."); Pa. Conference
of State Trial Judges Judicial Ethics Comm. Formal Op. 98-1 (1998), available at
http://origin-www.courts.state.pa.us/ethics/formal.htm ("As far as we have been able to
determine, no advisory bodies have interpreted Canon 2(b) to preclude a judge from
writing a letter of recommendation under appropriate circumstances."); S.C. Advisory
Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct Op. 5-1992 (1992), available at
http://www.sccourts.org/adv-opinion/displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinYR= 1 992&advOpinN
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Given that reference and recommendation letters are permitted
under judicial codes of conduct, the question becomes whether or not a
judge may mention his or her judicial status in the letter. It could be
argued that including the judicial title in a recommendation letter lends
the prestige attached to the title to the private interests of the subject of
the recommendation. However, many references are based upon the
knowledge gained by a judge while serving in a judicial capacity. Any
attempt to write a reference for a law clerk, court clerk, court reporter, or
lawyer who appears before the judge without mentioning the author's
judicial position borders on the ridiculous. In letters written for persons
who have worked with, or appeared before the judge, the judge's
position will be apparent from the content of the letter.155 If a judge did
creatively find a way to camouflage his or her office, the resulting letter
most likely would be so vague as to be useless. Disclosure of the judge's
position is also important in letters written on behalf of persons known to
0=5 ("Of those states addressing the issue, not one has issued an advisory opinion
interpreting this Canon [2B] so as to preclude a judge from writing letters of
recommendation."); see also infra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
Federal judges have been advised that instead of initiating a letter of
recommendation they should permit an applicant to list the judge as a reference. U.S.
Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Ethics Essentials, A Primer for New
Judges on Conflicts, Outside Activities, and Other Potential Pitfalls 9-10 (2006),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/library/ethicsessentials.pdf ("To avoid concerns, it
is preferable [for the judge] to be listed as a reference and respond to inquiries."); U.S.
Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct Op. 73 (1983, revised 1998), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/73.html ("It should also be recognized that there is
usually much less risk of violating Canon 2B in situations in which the judge merely
responds to an inquiry from the institution, than when the judge initiates the
recommendation. Accordingly, many judges have adopted a policy of responding to
requests for recommendations by declining to act, or by inviting the applicant to list the
judge as a reference .. "). Under the Judicial Conference Committee's approach, it is
assumed that the person or entity receiving an applicant's reference list will contact the
judge. Unfortunately, some schools, employers, and scholarship committees require
recommendation letters to be submitted with an application and will not contact
references in lieu of such letters. Even worse, the Committee's approach invites the
person in need of information about the applicant to telephone the judge. A telephone
conversation with its attendant, "yes, your honor's," "no, your honor's," and "of course,
your honor's," is certainly more coercive and plays more on judicial prestige than a letter.
As noted by Justice Brennan in a different context, "[a] letter.., can readily be put in a
drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded." Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n.,
486 U.S. 466, 475-76 (1988). Additionally, a written communication has the advantage
of memorializing the information and opinions transferred in the recommendation in the
event that a question arises as to the propriety of the content or tone of the reference.
155. Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 92-6 (1992), available at
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/ethics-opinions/92-06.pdf ("When a judge is
recommending an applicant who is a lawyer or former employee of the judge, the judge's
position will undoubtedly be apparent from the text of the letter in any event. Unless the
judge reveals his position, he is likely to be unable to explain the basis for his
recommendation.").
[Vol. 112:2
2007] ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF JUDICIAL STATIONERY 501
the judge in a non-judicial capacity because part of the value of any
recommendation is that the person "who acts as the reference is himself
or herself worthy of some reliance by the decision-maker."
1 56
Individuals and organizations receiving recommendation letters "would
like to know something about those making the recommendations.'
' 57
This desire for background information concerning the person providing
the reference is demonstrated by the fact that institutions of higher
learning routinely request not only the name of the referencer, but also
his or her position or title and organizational affiliation. 58  Most
jurisdictions accept the need for a judge to disclose his or her judicial
title in a recommendation letter, 159 although a few advisory committees
suggest that the judge's judicial status should not be mentioned. 1
60
156. Id.; see also Mo. Comm'n on Ret., Removal and Discipline Op. 133 (undated)
("An important part of any recommendation is a description of the person giving it .... );
Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges Op. 94-39 (1994), available at
http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/ninet4/94-
39.html ("[T]he fact that a judge is a trusted public official in a career that requires
certain analytical abilities, a high level of honesty and integrity, and that provides the
judge with an opportunity to observe these qualities in another may be highly relevant to
the recommendation itself.").
157. Ill. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 96-2 (1996), available at
http://www.ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/96-2.htm.
158. See, e.g., Boston University, Letter of Recommendation, http://www.bu.edu/
global/pdfs/recommendation.pdf (requesting the name, position and title, and
organization or company of the referencer) (last visited Oct. 2, 2007); Brown University,
Letter of Recommendation, http://gradschool.brown.edu/resources/generalinfo-
1 164642442.pdf (requesting name, position and institution of the referencer) (last visited
Oct. 2, 2007); George Mason University School of Law, Letter of Recommendation,
http://www.law.gmu.edu/admission/ltr of recommendation.pdf (requesting name,
position or title, and organization of referencer) (last visited Oct. 2, 2007); University of
Illinois, Executive MBA Letter of Recommendation, http://www.mbachicago.uiuc.edu/
pdf/recommendationjletter.pdf (requesting name, position or title, and institution or
organization of the referencer) (last visited Oct. 2, 2007); The University of New Mexico
School of Law, http://lawschool.unm.edu/admissions/apply/recommend form.pdf
(requesting name, title, and affiliation of the referencer) (last visited Oct. 2, 2007);
University of Oklahoma, Recommendation Form, http://price.ou.edu/prospstudents/
pdf/recommendation.pdf (requesting name, official title, and institution of the referencer)
(last visited Oct. 2, 2007); University of South Carolina, Letter of Recommendation,
http://cosw.sc.edu/ admissions/phd/letterofrec.pdf (requesting name, title, address and
telephone number of referencer) (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
159. Even Louisiana which by rule flatly prohibits the use of official stationery for
any recommendation permits the use of the judicial title in the letter. LA. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2B (2007) ("Letters of recommendation may be written only
on private stationery which does not contain any official designation of the judge's court,
but the judge may use his or her title.").
160. See, e.g., S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct Ops. 5-1992
(1992) and 31-1996 (1996), available at http://www.sccourts.org/adv-opinion/index.cfm
(permitting judge to write a letter of recommendation so long as it is not on judicial
stationery and does not reveal the author's judicial status); Wash. Ethics Advisory
Comm. Op. 86-12 (1986), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs-orgs/
pos.ethics/?fa=pos ethics.dispopin&mode=8612 (warning that a recommendation letter
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The general consensus permitting judges to provide letters of
recommendation and to identify their judicial status in the letter has not
extended to the question of the propriety of using court stationery for a
recommendation. Partly because neither the 1972 nor 1990 Model Code
provides guidance on the issue, courts and advisory committees have
taken a multitude of divergent approaches on the use of official
stationery for references and recommendations.
161
Many jurisdictions authorize the use of judicial stationery for
references and recommendations. For example, the Commentary to
Canon 2B of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "a judge
may use judicial letterhead to write character reference letters when such
letters are otherwise permitted under this Code."' 62  In West Virginia
judges may provide letters of recommendation "on official letterhead,
which need not bear the words 'personal and unofficial."", 163 Similarly,
Canon 2B(4) of the California Code of Judicial Ethics permits letters of
reference or recommendation to be "written on stationery that uses the
judicial title."'164
At least two states permit the use of official stationery, but suggest
that the judge add a disclaimer in order to avoid the appearance that the
for a friend should not reveal that the author is a judge).
161. See infra notes 162-69; see also Cynthia Gray, Recommendations by Judges 6-7
(Am. Judicature Soc'y 1996) (discussing the various state rules governing the use of
court stationery for letters of reference and recommendation).
162. FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 2B cmt. (2007); see Fla. Judicial Ethics
Advisory Comm. Op. 2007-06 (2007), available at http://www.jud6.org/
LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/ eacopinions/2007/2007-06.htm (applying
Canon 2B so as to permit a fellowship recommendation to appear on judicial stationery).
163. W.VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B cmt. (2007).
164. CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2B(4) (2007); see also ARK. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B cmt. (2006) ("Letters of recommendation may be written
on judicial stationery based on personal knowledge of the applicant, but not merely for
the purpose of lending the prestige of judicial office to the applicant."); Ill. Judicial Ethics
Comm. Op. 96-2 (1996), available at http://www.ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/96-2.htm
(finding that use of court stationery for a reference or recommendation does not violate
Canon 2B); Ind. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications Op. 3-88 (1988), available at
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/jud-qual/docs/adops/3-88.pdf ("[T]he Commission cannot
view an ordinary recommendation from a judge, even if drafted on court stationery, as an
exploitation which Canon 2 is designed to prevent."); Md. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op.
1977-5 (1977), available at http://mdcourts.gov/ethics/pdfs/1977-05.pdf (advising that a
letter of recommendation to a military academy or other educational institution may
appear on official stationery); Mo. Comm'n on Ret., Removal and Discipline Op. 133
(undated) (approving judicial stationery for judicial appointment, bar admission,
education, and employment recommendations); Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel Op.
2002-7 (2002), available at http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/
DeliverDocument.asp?CitelD=439110 ("Any [recommendation] letter that is appropriate
for a judge to write may be written on official stationery."); Pa. Conference of State Trial
Judges Judicial Ethics Comm. Formal Op. 98-1 (1998), available at http://origin-
www.courts.state.pa.us/ethics/formal.htm (same).
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reference constitutes an official act rather than a personal act. The
Commentary to Canon 2B of the Virginia Canons of Judicial Conduct
states that "[w]hen using court stationery for letters of reference an
indication should be made that the opinion expressed is personal and not
an opinion of the court." 165 New York judges have also been cautioned
to include the phrase "personal and unofficial" in any reference letter
written on court stationery.
166
Some states only allow judicial letterhead for certain categories of
recommendations and references. For example, in New Hampshire a
judge may use court stationery if the recommendation is based upon
"judicial knowledge" or the recipient of the letter "may reasonably be
expected to know that the writer is a judge. 167  In the state of
Washington official letterhead may be used for court personnel and
attorneys appearing before the judge, but not for family or friends.
168
A few states prohibit the use of court stationery for any
recommendation letter.' 
69
165. VA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B cmt. (2007). The word "should"
makes this provision aspirational rather than mandatory. Id. Preamble (stating that the
use of the word "should" or the phrase "should not" even when included in the text of a
Canon "is intended as a statement of what is or is not appropriate conduct but not as a
binding rule under which a judge may be disciplined.").
166. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Ops. 88-10 (1988), 93-26 (1993), 04-
31 (2004), and 06-10 (2006), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/
opinions; see also Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 92-6 (1992), available at
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/ethics-opinions/92-06.pdf (suggesting that the
words "Personal and Unofficial" be included in any recommendation letter written on
court stationery for a personal friend).
167. N.H. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B cmt. (2007).
168. Wash. Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 93-24 (1993), available at
http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs-Orgs/pos-ethics/?fa=pos-ethics.dispopin&mode=93
24.
169. See, e.g., LA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (2007) (requiring a
recommendation to be written on private stationery but allowing use of the judicial title in
the letter); S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct Ops. 5-1992 (1992)
and 31-1996 (1996), available at http://www.sccourts.org/adv-opinion/index.cfm
(advising that reference letters should be written on plain paper); Guidelines for
Extrajudicial Activities Annotated (Sup. Ct. N.J. Advisory Comm. on Extrajudicial
Activities, May 2004) § XI, Addendum A, available at http://njlegallib.rutgers.edu/
misc/EJ__guide-anno_2004_May.html ("[Recommendation letters] should be sent on
personal stationery only .... ). The New Jersey rule prohibiting the use of court
stationery for recommendation letters is not absolute. See N.J. Advisory Comm. on
Extrajudicial Activities Op. 02-07 (2007) (copy on file with author) (permitting the use of
official stationery for a letter in support of a nominee for a bar association award); see
also Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel Op. 2002-7 (2002), available at
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CitelD=439110 ("A few
states prohibit the use of 'official stationery' [for recommendations] but most do not.").
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A. Evolution of the 2007 Model Code Comment Regarding the Use of
Official Stationery for Recommendations and References
The drafters of the 2007 Model Code struggled with the issue of the
use of judicial stationery for letters of recommendation.170 Cognizant of
the various approaches the states took under the 1972 and 1990 Model
Codes, and recognizing that one purpose of a model code is to "provide[]
a degree of uniformity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,"1 7 1 the Joint
Commission sought to provide guidance on when, if ever, a
recommendation could be conveyed on court stationery. After
determining that the Code would not follow the lead of states permitting
court stationery for all letters of recommendation or the lead of states
flatly rejecting the use of official letterhead for recommendation letters,
the Joint Commission searched for a middle ground. 172  Finding the
middle ground took time and effort. 173 The first draft of Canon 3 of the
2007 Model Code suggested that official stationery only be used for a
reference or recommendation based on information obtained in the
judge's judicial capacity:
170. See Transcript of Proceedings Before the Joint Commission to Evaluate the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct at 90 (Mar. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Transcript] (reporting
Commission member Judge Peter W. Bowie's statement that during his 16 years on the
bench he "wrestled" with the "question of letters of recommendation"), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/meetings/transcript-032604.pdf; see also infra notes
174-90 and accompanying text.
171. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 1.02, at 5 (3d ed.
2000).
172. See Transcript at 91-92 (Mar. 26, 2004) (reporting Cynthia Gray's testimony
before the Joint Commission that the American Judicature Society's proposal regarding
the use of official stationery was, in effect, a compromise between the states that allowed
court stationery for all recommendations and the states that prohibited its use for any
recommendation), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/meetings/
transcript_032604.pdf; see also infra notes 175-92 and accompanying text.
173. The Joint Commission devoted considerable effort to developing a comment
governing the use of official stationery for references and recommendation because it was
aware of the frequency with which judges seek advice on the subject. See Cara Lee
Neville, Discussing the Judicial Code is Like Discussing Religion, 46 JUDGES J., Summer
2007, at 37, 39 ("The most-asked questions by judges of their state judicial enforcement
officials are What are the rules about writing letters of recommendation? and When can I
use judicial letterhead?"). Judge Neville was a member of the Joint Commission. Id. In
testimony before the Joint Commission, Cynthia Gray placed inquires regarding
recommendation letters high on her list of questions frequently asked of judicial advisory
boards. See Transcript at 88 (March 26, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/meetings/transcript_032604.pdf. For the views of two members of the
Joint Commission on the use of court letterhead for recommendations, see Transcript at
159-161 (Feb. 24, 2005, part 2) (Dean James Alfini), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/meetings/transcript_022405_part2.pdf and Transcript at 90-92 (Mar. 26,
2004) (Judge Peter W. Bowie), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/
meetings/transcript_032604.pdf.
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A judge may provide a reference or recommendation for an
individual based upon the judge's personal knowledge. However,
unless the recommendation is based upon information obtained
through the judge's expertise or experience as a judge, the reference
or recommendation should not be communicated on the judge's
judicial letterhead.
174
The prohibition against using court stationery for recommendations
based on something other than judicial knowledge was abandoned in the
next draft of the 2007 Code in favor of a caution to avoid official
letterhead and other "actions" if the letterhead or "action" could be
perceived as exerting official pressure. 175 Borrowing language from a
federal advisory opinion,' 76 Comment [5] to Rule 3.02 of the June 2005
Preliminary Draft of the 2007 Model Code was redrafted to provide in
part:
In any case, in considering whether it is appropriate to write the
recommendation on official or personal letterhead, the judge should
carefully consider whether the recommendation or endorsement
might reasonably be perceived as exerting pressure by reason of his
or her judicial office, and should avoid any action that could be so
understood. 1
77
In the third proposed draft of the 2007 Model Code released in
December 2005, Rule 3.02 of the June 2005 Preliminary Draft, was
renumbered, Rule 3.01.178 Comment [2] to Rule 3.01 deleted any
reference to other pressure causing "actions" and refocused attention
solely on the danger that official stationery might have a coercive affect
on the recipient of a recommendation letter:
In any case, in considering whether to write the recommendation on
official or personal letterhead, the judge should carefully consider
whether use of official letterhead might reasonably be perceived as an
attempt to exert pressure by reason of his or her judicial office. The
judge should avoid use of the office letterhead if the judge concludes
174. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3.01 cmt. [5] (2007) (Discussion
Draft July 2004).
175. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.02 cmt. [5] (2007) (Preliminary
Draft June 2005).
176. U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct Op. 73 (1983, last revised
1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/73.html ("In any case, the judge
should carefully consider whether the recommendation or endorsement might reasonably
be perceived as exerting pressure by reason of his or her judicial office, and should avoid
any action which could be so understood.").
177. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.02 cmt. [5] (2007) (Preliminary Draft
June 2005).
178. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.01 (2007) (Final Draft Report Dec.
2005).
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that there is a likelihood of such a perception.
179
In the next draft of the Code, the prohibition against the misuse of
the prestige of judicial office was transferred from Rule 3.01 to Rule
1.3180 and Comment [2] under old Rule 3.01 was modified and
designated as Comment [2] under new Rule 1.3."' As modified,
Comment [2] strengthened the prohibition against using official
stationery when it could be viewed as exerting pressure by removing the
aspirational term "should" from the commentary. 182 The modification
also added a new requirement. The Joint Commission apparently feared
that court stationery might lead one to erroneously conclude that the
reference was an official act of the court. To avoid this misconception,
the drafters mandated that any recommendation on official letterhead
include a disclaimer that the recommendation expressed the personal
opinion of the judge and not the opinion of the court.183 Comment [2] to
Rule 1.3 of the draft Model Code released on October 31, 2006, stated:
A judge may provide a reference or recommendation for an
individual based upon the judge's personal knowledge. The judge
may use official letterhead if the judge indicates that the reference is
personal and not the view of the court and if there is no likelihood
that the use of the letterhead would reasonably be perceived as an
attempt to exert pressure by reason of the judicial office.
184
About seven weeks later, on December 20, 2006, the Joint
Commission issued a Report to the ABA House of Delegates.'85 This
report included the Commission's final version of the proposed 2007
Model Code. 186 In fine-tuning the final version of the new Code, the
Report made yet another change, albeit a slight change, in the text of
Comment [2]. Concluding that it would be redundant to require a judge
to indicate that a recommendation is the personal act of the judge and
also indicate that the recommendation does not reflect the view of the
court, the Joint Commission eliminated the phrase "and not the view of
179. Id. cmt. [2].
180. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (2007) (Report Nov. 2006).




185. Report of the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (Dec. 20, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/
house report.html.
186. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007) (House Report Dec. 2006). Ten
amendments to the December 2006 House Report were filed by the Joint Commission
with the House of Delegates on February 6, 2007. See supra note 30. The amendments
did not modify Rule 1.3 or the Comment to the Rule as submitted in the December House
Report.
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the court" from Comment [2].187 As a result, the final version of
Comment [2] to Rule 1.3 of the proposed 2007 Model Code as submitted
to the House of Delegates provided:
A judge may provide a reference or recommendation for an
individual based upon the judge's personal knowledge. The judge
may use official letterhead if the judge indicates that the reference is
personal and if there is no likelihood that the use of the letterhead
would reasonably be perceived as an attempt to exert pressure by
reason of the judicial office. 1
88
This version of Comment [2] was adopted as part of the 2007 Model
Code approved by the ABA House of Delegates. 189 In sum, it permits a
judge to use official letterhead for a reference or recommendation
provided (1) the letter contains a disclaimer indicating that the reference
or recommendation is the judge's personal act and (2) the use of official
letterhead will not reasonably be perceived by others as an attempt to
exert pressure because of the power or prestige of the judicial office. 190
B. Mandatory or Hortatory Nature of Comment [2]
The initial question to be addressed in assessing the effect the new
commentary will have on the judiciary of the jurisdictions in which it is
adopted, is whether the provisions of Comment [2] to Rule 1.3 are
mandatory or merely hortatory. The distinction is, of course, important
because a violation of a mandatory requirement of the 2007 Model Code
may subject a judge to discipline while failure to comply with a hortatory
declaration will not.'
91
According to the Scope section of the 2007 Model Code, the
Comments accompanying the Rules serve two separate and distinct
functions. 192  First, some Comments provide guidance to judges
regarding the "purpose, meaning, and proper application of the Rules."'
' 93
Examples of permitted and prohibited conduct are provided in many of
187. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [2] (2007) (House Report Dec.
2006).
188. Id.
189. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [2] (2007).
190. Id.
191. Id. Scope [2]. The 1990 Model Code also included mandatory and hortatory
provisions. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble (1990); Harris v. Smartt, 57
P.3d 58, 71 (Mont. 2002) ("The Preamble to the [1990 Model] Code specifically states
that use of the word 'shall' indicates mandatory conduct the violation of which subjects a
judge to possible discipline; 'should' is hortatory and is used for suggested conduct not
subject to discipline; and 'may' is used for discretionary conduct."), vacated on other
grounds, 68 P.3d 889 (Mont. 2003).
192. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Scope [3] (2007).
193. Id.
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these Comments in order to illustrate how a Rule must be interpreted and
applied. 94 When fulfilling this first function, non-compliance with an
example or illustration found in a Comment constitutes a sanctionable
Rule violation. 195 A second and separate function of other Comments is
to identify aspirational, non-binding goals for judges. 196 These goals are
designed to motivate judges to embrace and honor the very "highest
ethical standards," standards that exceed the minimum enforceable
ethical requirements embodied in the Rules.' 97 Failure to comply with
these aspirational suggestions might constitute disappointing or even
inappropriate judicial conduct, but cannot form the basis of a disciplinary
complaint.1
98
Examining Comment [2] in the context of these two purposes, it is
immediately apparent that the Comment does not include any language
indicating an aspirational intent. 199 The word "should," which is used in
other Canon 1 Comments to designate suggested rather than mandated
judicial conduct,200 is conspicuously absent from Comment [2].2o1 This
194. Id.
195. Although the 2007 Model Code consists of Canons, Rules, and Comments a
judge may be disciplined only for violating a Rule. Canons merely state overarching
ethical principals and do not provide a basis for a disciplinary action. Comments neither
add to nor subtract from the obligations established by the Rules, but some Comments
specifically identify conduct that a Rule requires or prohibits. When serving the purpose
of explaining the specific application of a Rule, a violation of a Comment is a violation of
the Rule. Id. Scope [1]-[4].
196. Id. Scope [4].
197. Id.
198. Id. Scope [2].
199. The 2007 Model Code uses words such as "should," "may," "encourage," and
"preferable," to signal an aspirational or permissive intent. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.5 cmt. [4] (2007) ("A judge should monitor and supervise cases
in ways that reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable delays, and unnecessary
costs.") (emphasis added); id. R. 2.8 cmt. [3] ("A judge... may meet with jurors who
choose to remain after trial .. ") (emphasis added); id. R. 2.1 cmt. [2] ("[J]udges are
encouraged to participate in activities that promote public understanding of and
confidence in the justice system.") (emphasis added); id. R. 4.1 cmt. [9] ("[A] judicial
candidate is permitted to respond directly to false, misleading, or unfair allegations ...
although it is preferable for someone else to respond if the allegations relate to a pending
case.") (emphasis added); see also infra note 200.
200. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. [4] (2007) ("Judges
should participate in activities that promote ethical conduct among judges and lawyers,
support professionalism within the judiciary and the legal profession, and promote access
to justice for all.") (emphasis added); id. cmt. [6] ("A judge should initiate and participate
in community outreach activities for the purpose of promoting public understanding of
and confidence in the administration of justice.") (emphasis added). The terms "should"
and "may," even when used in a Rule of the 2007 Model Code, are "permissive terms"
committing the conduct being addressed "to the personal and professional discretion of
the judge or candidate in question, and no disciplinary action should be taken for action
or inaction within the bounds of such discretion." Id. Scope [2].
201. See id. Rule 1.3 cmt. [2].
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omission is even more telling because the first three drafts of the
Comment did include the hortatory "should" in defining a judge's
responsibility when using official stationery for letters of
recommendation.2 °2 Comment [2] more readily fits the mandatory
category of Comments since it explains the proper application of Rule
1.3 and provides examples of permitted and prohibited conduct under
that Rule.20 3 Comment [2] states that properly understood, Rule 1.3
requires a "personal" designation on court stationery in order to avoid the
appearance that the recommendation or reference expresses the opinion
of the court.20 4 The Comment goes one step further indicating that a
proper reading of Rule 1.3 also requires a judge to recognize situations in
which the use of court letterhead, even bearing a "personal" designation,
will be perceived as an attempt to exert pressure and to use personal
stationery in those situations.20 5 If, as it appears, Comment [2] explains
what Rule 1.3 requires, then a violation of either of its provisions
constitutes a sanctionable transgression.
C. Will the Courts Embrace the New Commentary?
Over the past three decades, jurisdictions have developed and
refined their own rules governing the use of judicial stationery for
references and recommendations.20 6 Unless a particular jurisdiction has
faced problems with judges misusing court stationery for letters of
recommendation or has encountered difficulty in the interpretation or
application of its rules, there may be little incentive to adopt
Comment [2] to Rule 1.3. In addition, there are several independent
considerations that militate against fully embracing the new commentary.
First, the need for every letter of recommendation on official
stationery to include an indication that the letter is the unofficial,
personal act of the judge is questionable. Recommendation letters of the
type authorized under judicial codes are reviewed by sophisticated
individuals with a sufficient knowledge that letters of recommendation
are private, not judicial, acts. Recommendation and reference letters sent
to educational institutions, governmental agencies, scholarship
committees, private businesses, and judicial screening committees are
not likely to be considered court orders or official acts of a judge or
202. See supra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
203. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt [2] (2007).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 162-69. The Maryland Judicial Ethics Committee issued an
opinion discussing the use of court stationery for recommendations in 1977. Md. Judicial
Ethics Comm. Op. 1977-5 (1977), available at http://mdcourts.gov/ethics/pdfs/1977-
05.pdf
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court. Recipients of recommendation letters take them for what they are,
personal recommendations from individuals who at least claim a special
knowledge of the applicant's abilities and qualifications. This is
precisely why many states feel comfortable allowing recommendation
letters to appear on judicial stationery without a "personal" or "personal
and unofficial" disclaimer. Of course, there may be a rare or isolated
instance where a judge sends a letter of recommendation to an individual
lacking the sophistication necessary to understand that the reference
letter is not an official judicial act. For example, a judge might have
occasion to send a letter to a neighbor or friend recommending a baby-
sitter or tutor employed by the judge. If the judge fears that the neighbor
or friend might regard the reference as an official court act, the judge
could use private stationery or mark official stationery personal and
unofficial, or better yet simply telephone the individual who needs a
baby-sitter or tutor. But even in these situations, the danger that the
recipient of the recommendation will confuse personal and judicial acts
is remote and certainly not sufficient to warrant a broad unforgiving rule
requiring blanket disclaimers.
A second shortcoming of Comment [2], is the lack of guidance it
offers in determining the circumstances under which the use of court
stationery will cause an otherwise non-offending recommendation letter
to "exert pressure" on the recipient. Comment [2] provides that official
stationery may be used for a reference letter if there is "no likelihood that
the use of the letterhead would reasonably be perceived as an attempt to
exert pressure by means of the judicial office., 20 7  This statement
properly focuses attention on what is at the heart of Rule 1.3, namely, the
use of the power or prestige of a public judicial office to exert pressure in
a private matter. If a letter for any reason is objectively perceived to
exert pressure, an ethical violation occurs. This is not new.20 8 What is
new is the Code's specific focus on the coercive effects of judicial
stationery when used for a reference and the necessary implication that
under some circumstances the use of official stationery, without more,
207. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [2] (2007).
208. See In re Gallagher, 951 P.2d 705, 715 (Ore. 1998) (recognizing that using the
judicial office as a "pressure tactic" to gain a personal advantage undermines public
confidence in the judiciary); In re Ohlig, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial
Conduct Nov. 19, 2001), available at http://www.scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/O/
Ohlig.htm (disciplining a judge for using the "trappings" of judicial office to pressure an
attorney for the judge's personal gain); Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 96-13
(1996), available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/ethicsopinions/96-1 3.pdf
("Nor should a judge allow the prestige of the office to be used to pressure persons in any
manner."); U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. of Codes of Conduct Op. 73 (1983, revised
1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/73.html (advising judges to
carefully consider whether a letter of recommendation might be perceived as exerting
pressure of the judicial office).
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will cause a recommendation or reference to be perceived as improperly
exerting judicial pressure. The focus on the misuse of letterhead for
recommendations is surprising because experience has shown that
official stationery is most likely to be abused, not in the context of
recommendations letters, but in the context of a judge's private disputes
or financial, business, family or other personal matters. 20 9  Rarely, if
ever, has it been necessary to discipline a judge for choosing official
rather than personal stationery for a job, school, bar admission, or similar
reference. 2  Because there is not a body of disciplinary decisions
defining when the use of court stationery for letters of recommendation
exerts pressure, it would seem essential that Comment [2] provide
examples of the types of recommendation letters Rule 1.3 prohibits from
appearing on court letterhead. The absence of illustrations will make it
difficult for judges to identify the precise circumstances under which
official stationery will be deemed coercive. This is especially true
because as a general proposition, the use of the judicial title in a
recommendation letter, which is apparently permitted by Rule 1.3, exerts
as much if not more "pressure" than the use of official letterhead.
Moreover, in situations where a recipient of a recommendation is most
likely to feel "pressure," the form of the stationery is inconsequential.
For example, in the context of employment recommendations, a law firm
which regularly appears before a judge might feel "pressure" upon
receipt of a judge's letter on behalf of a lawyer seeking a position with
the firm. But in such cases the "pressure" arises from the law firm's
209. See supra Part III.C.2 (providing examples of disciplinary actions based upon a
judge using official stationery in financial, business, family, and other private matters).
210. Even states that flatly prohibit the use of court stationery for recommendations
are reluctant to discipline a judge for a simple, non-aggravated violation of the rule. For
example, in In re Miller, 949 So. 2d 379 (La. 2007), the judge wrote an employment
reference on court stationery for his secretary in direct violation of Canon 2B of the
Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits any recommendation from appearing
on judicial stationery. The Supreme Court of Louisiana did sanction the judge for this
violation but only because of the mountain of aggravating circumstances surrounding the
letter including that the judge filed a paternity suit claiming the secretary's child was his;
signed his secretary's divorce decree which designated his secretary as the domiciliary
parent of the child he claimed to have fathered; and advised his secretary's prospective
employer that he was the father of his secretary's child. Id. at 382-84. In disciplining the
judge the court went out of its way to point out that "[a]though a clear violation of the
Canons, this admitted conduct [providing a reference on court stationery] would likely
not rise to the level of sanctionable conduct were it standing alone." Id. at 394. This was
especially magnanimous of the court in light of Judge Miller's counsel characterizing the
improper use of court stationery claim as the "Mickey-Mouse charge." Id. at 389 n.15;
see also N.M. Judicial Advisory Comm. Op. 1990-3 (1990) (describing the committee's
research as establishing that judges have been disciplined for providing references and
recommendations "only in the most blatant type of situation where the judge has required
the hiring of individuals where the judge had some control over the hirer and/or received
some benefit, usually sexual.").
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regular contact with the judge, not from the form of the stationery used to
convey the recommendation.21 l
Third, the absence of illustrative examples not only puts individual
judges at a personal disadvantage in determining whether to use plain or
professional stationery, but also works to defeat an underlying purpose of
any code of judicial conduct, namely to "provide guidance and assist
judges in maintaining the highest standards of judicial and personal
conduct., 212 The 2007 Model Code relentlessly reminds its audience that
each section of the Code, including the Scope and Terminology
sections,2 13 Canons,2 14 Rules, 2 15 and Comments216 is designed to guide
judges in their efforts to conduct their personal and judicial lives in a
manner that promotes public confidence.217 Comment [2] simply fails to
supply such guidance. 1 Moreover, Comment [2]'s lack of specificity
hinders the Code's equally laudatory goal of promoting "national
uniformity" in the rules governing judicial conduct in the various
jurisdictions.219 A few examples of the type of recommendation letters
prohibited from appearing on court stationery or a list of factors to
consider when choosing personal or official stationery would go a long
way in fostering a consistent and uniform interpretation of Comment [2].
211. New York judges have been advised not to send a job recommendation,
regardless of the form of the letterhead, to a law firm that regularly appears before the
judge because of the possible "coercive" effect of the letter. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on
Judicial Ethics Op. 88-53 (1988), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/
opinions/88-53_.pdf
212. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble [3] (2007).
213. Id. Scope [1] ("Scope and Terminology sections provide additional guidance in
interpreting and applying the Code.").
214. Id. Scope [2] ("[T]he Canons provide important guidance in interpreting the
Rules.").
215. See, e.g., id. R. 2.14 (Reporter's Explanation of Changes) ("The objective of this
provision [Rule 2.14] is to guide and encourage judges .... ).
216. Id. Scope [3] (explaining that some Comments "provide guidance regarding the
purpose, meaning, and proper application of the Rules.").
217. Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Chair
Message, http;//www.abanet.org/judicialethics (stressing the Joint Commission's work
"to provide sound, clear and reasoned guidance to judges" so that the personal and
professional conduct of judges will help foster public confidence in the judiciary).
218. Comment [2] is not much more helpful than the advice given in the Kentucky
Code of Judicial Conduct which exhorts that "[A] judge should be careful in the use of
the judge's letterhead." KY. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 cmt. (2006).
219. Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Chair
Message, http;//www.abanet.org/judicialethics ("It is hoped that the revised Code will
promote national uniformity and be adopted by the highest court of each state."); MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Application cmt. [1] (2007) ("The Rules... are premised
upon the supposition that a uniform system of ethical principals should apply to all those
authorized to perform judicial functions."); see also JEFFERY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND ETHICS 1.02, at 5 (3d ed. 2000) (recognizing that one purpose of a model
code is to "provide[] a degree of uniformity from jurisdiction to jurisdiction").
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The absence of adequate specificity makes it less likely that states will
see a benefit in adopting Comment [2], and renders the possibility of
divergent interpretations by the states that do adopt the provision almost
a certainty.
In sum, there is no compelling reason to require each and every
recommendation letter to include a "personal" designation. Recipients of
the type of recommendation letters permitted under the 2007 Model
Code are well aware that recommendations are not official acts of a
court. Nor is reiteration of the rule against employing judicial stationery
to exert pressure of much value to judges in their everyday lives without
guidance as to when coercion is likely to occur in the context of letters of
recommendations. Just as important, the vagueness of the Comment
defeats the Model Code's underlying purposes of guidance and
uniformity. As a result, there may be little incentive for a jurisdiction to
incorporate Comment [2] to Rule 1.3 into its code of judicial conduct.
D. Interpreting and Applying the New Commentary
Shortcomings notwithstanding, it is certain that some jurisdictions
will adopt Comment [2] either because the Comment is similar to the
jurisdiction's current rule or because the jurisdiction is convinced, based
upon the experience and reputation of the ABA and Joint Commission,
that the Comment [2] provisions are superior to its present policy.
220
Judges in these jurisdictions will need some help in determining what
conduct is necessary to comply with Comment [2]. This is true whether
the Comment is interpreted as imposing mandatory requirements, as
suggested in this Article, or interpreted as advisory and non-binding.
22'
In the discussion that follows, an attempt is made to provide some
assistance in interpreting and applying the new commentary to everyday
situations faced by judges.
1. Disclaiming the Official Nature of a Recommendation
Comment [2]'s requirement that every reference or recommendation
on official stationery carry a disclaimer indicating that the letter
220. See Cynthia Gray, The 2007 ABA Model Code: Taking Judicial Ethics Standards
to the Next Level, 90 JUDICATURE 284, 292 (2007) ("[T]he state and federal judiciaries
have always looked to the [ABA] model code for inspiration and the national consensus
on judicial ethics issues."); Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, The Appearance of
Impropriety, and the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1337, 1359
(2006) (observing that a model code of judicial conduct recommended by the ABA
"comes with a presumption of authority, and state and federal courts are likely to adopt
it").
221. Judges should, and do, strive to comply with both the mandatory and aspirational
provisions of codes of judicial conduct.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
expresses the judge's personal and unofficial opinion, while of doubtful
necessity or value, is easily satisfied. Simply including a sentence in the
body of the correspondence stating that, for instance, "This letter
expresses the personal opinion of the author," would be sufficient.
Alternatively, the disclaimer requirement could be met by including the
word "personal," or the phrase "personal and unofficial," on court
stationery used for recommendations or references. 2
Interpreting the provision of Comment [2] requiring a judge to
avoid the use of official letterhead if it will be perceived as an attempt to
exert pressure is more difficult.
2. Recommendations Related to Judicial Experience
There is no question that the content of a recommendation can exert
223pressure or appear coercive. Marking a recommendation letter
"urgent," or including the statement "call me if you do not hire my law
clerk," or conveying the impression that the judge is conducting a
personal campaign to find a friend a job,224 are all inimical to the concept
of public confidence in the judiciary. But these statements exert pressure
whether on official or personal stationery, and for that matter, whether or
not the judge includes his or her title in the letter. It is not this type of
content based impropriety that Comment [2] addresses. Comment [2]
focuses on form not substance. It directs judges to identify situations in
which official letterhead, by itself, is likely to create an appearance of
222. The Virginia Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee has found that including the
phrase "personal and unofficial" on court letterhead satisfies the Comment to Canon 2B
of the Virginia Canons of Judicial Conduct suggesting that "[wihen using court stationery
for letters of reference an indication should be made that the opinion expressed is
personal and not an opinion of the court." Va. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 06-1
(2006), available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/jirc/opinions/2006/06_l.html; see also
N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 04-31 (2004), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/04-31 .htm (permitting
recommendations on court stationery "provided that the words 'Personal and Unofficial'
are prominently displayed.").
223. See e.g., In re McKeon, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct
Aug. 6, 1998), available at http://scjc.state.ny.us/Determinations/M/McKeon.htm (basing
censure in part on the coercive content of a judge's recommendation letter "urg[ing]" and
"implor[ing]" an employer "to expedite the appointment of a young woman .. "); In re
Wright, Determination (N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct June 20, 1988),
available at http://scjc.state.ny.us/DeterminationsW/\Wright,-bruce.htm (finding the
judge's letter "beseeching" a modeling agency to reinstate a fired model to be an
improper use of judicial prestige).
224. Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 94-1 (1994), available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/94-1h.html ("[A] judge should not follow up his letter
with any activity that smacks of a campaign on behalf of the applicant. Such an effort
tends to convey the impression that the hiring of the applicant is of such importance to
the judge that the recommendee may-rightly or wrongly-be concerned about the
consequences of a negative decision.").
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pressure and to use personal stationery in those situations.
As a starting point, there are some instances where it is relatively
certain that the use of court stationery could not be reasonably construed
to exert pressure because of the judge's official position. For example,
there seems to be a consensus that court stationery is not coercive where
the judge's judicial experience is relevant or germane to the reference or
recommendation.225  Although precisely when a judge's judicial
experience is relevant or germane to a reference is somewhat unclear, it
is clear that a letter based on information or knowledge obtained by a
judge while serving in a judicial role in the courthouse falls into this
category.226 Accordingly, recommendation letters for court reporters,
court clerks, secretaries, administrative staff, court security officers, law
clerks, probation officers, lawyers and others appearing before the judge
in their professional capacities are properly presented on official
letterhead.
Judicial experience is also relevant to recommendations written for
individuals a judge meets in his or her official capacity outside of the
courthouse. These individuals include lawyers and non-lawyers a judge
works with on bar association committees and other law-related projects
and programs.227
225. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [2] (2007) (Reporter's
Explanation of Changes). The Reporter's Explanation states in part:
The Commission was in accord that judges should be permitted to use their
titles and office letterheads when writing references for people with respect to
whom the judge's experience as a judge was relevant. The prohibition on
abusing the prestige of judicial office to advance the interests of another is
intended to prevent inappropriate exploitation of judges' positions, and there is
nothing inappropriate about judges identifying themselves as such when
judicial experience is germane to the recommendation.
Id.; see also N.H. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (2006) (official stationery may
be used for a recommendation based on "judicial knowledge"); Wash. Ethics Advisory
Comm. Op. 93-24 (1993), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs-orgs/
pos-ethics/?fa=pos ethics.dispopin&mode=9324 (permitting official stationery for
recommendations for court personnel or attorneys who have appeared before the judge).
The American Judicature Society takes a similar position advocating that official
stationery may be used when a judge writes a recommendation for someone the judge
knows in his or her "official capacity." See Personal Use of Court Resources, JUDICIAL
CONDUCT REP., Fall 2004, at p.1, 6. The American Judicature Society is not in favor of
permitting the use of court stationery "if the basis for the reference is unrelated to the
judge's office, for example, for a neighbor or personal friend." Id.
226. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [2] (2007) (Reporter's
Explanation of Changes) ("The Comment thus clarifies that a judge may write
[recommendation] letters on the basis of a judge's experience on the job (e.g. law
clerks) .... ).
227. See N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 93-129 (1993), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/93-129_.pdf (permitting judge to
nominate lawyer for a position on the Commercial Panel of the American Arbitration
Association based upon their joint bar activities spanning several years). For a contrary
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The Reporter's Explanation of Changes accompanying the 2007
Model Code goes further stating that a judge's "judicial experience"
includes a judge's "general expertise in the law.''228  Under the
Reporter's interpretation, a judge may use official stationery in preparing
a law school recommendation for an individual known to the judge only
in the capacity of neighbor or friend.22 9 Following this same rationale, a
judge's "general expertise in the law" should permit the use of official
stationery when recommending a friend, neighbor, or relative for any
law-related educational or employment opportunity or admission to the
bar. Just as a judge has learned what it takes to become a successful law
student, a judge knows what abilities and qualities are necessary to
succeed as lawyer, court reporter, legal secretary, law professor, or other
professional in the law. Without question, court stationery should be
permitted for a recommendation submitted to a judicial nominating
commission or appointing authority, 230 regardless of whether the person
view see Ethics Essentials, A Primer for New Judges on Conflicts, Outside Activities, and
Other Potential Pitfalls 9-10 (U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct
2006) (advising new judges against serving as an employment reference for an attorney
with whom the judge served on a bar association committee). It is unclear what rationale
underlies the Judicial Conference Committee's refusal to recognize that sufficient
knowledge may be gained during service on a bar association committee to support an
employment recommendation. Some bar association work undoubtedly provides a judge
with personal knowledge of an attorney's skill and ability upon which to form an opinion
as to the attorney's fitness for a particular position. The ABA Joint Commission to
Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct is a good example of a lengthy, demanding,
intellectually challenging committee assignment that would provide an adequate basis for
a letter in support of a Commission member seeking, for example, a position teaching
judicial ethics.
228. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [2] (2007) (Reporter's
Explanation of Changes).
229. Id.
230. The Commentary to Canon 2B of the 1990 Model Code permits judges to
participate in the judicial selection process "by cooperating with appointing authorities
and screening committees seeking names for consideration, and by responding to official
inquiries concerning a person being considered for a judgeship." MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B cmt. (1990). Under this provision judges need not wait to
be contacted by screening or appointing bodies but may initiate letters of
recommendation. See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 60 (2004);
N.M. Judicial Advisory Comm. Op. 05-03 (2005), available at http://jec.unm.edu/
resources/advisoryopinions/No05O03.pdf (concluding that Canon 2B authorizes letters of
reference by judges on behalf of nominees for judicial vacancies); Ohio Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline Op. 95-5 (1995), available at
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/BOC/Advisory-Opinions/1995/op%2095-005.doc
(advising that a judge may write a letter on behalf of an individual seeking a federal
judgeship). The 2007 Model Code contains a Comment similar, but not identical, to the
1990 Model Code provision. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [3] (2007)
("Judges may participate in the process of judicial selection by cooperating with
appointing authorities and screening committees, and by responding to inquiries from
such entities concerning the professional qualifications of a person being considered for
judicial office.").
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recommended is known to the judge in a judicial or non-judicial
capacity. Not only is a judge's position and experience highly relevant
to the judicial selection process, 23 ' but a judge has a professional, not
personal, responsibility to advance the administration of justice by
conveying pertinent information and opinions to judicial selection
officials. 232 Finally, official stationery would appear appropriate for a
letter supporting the nomination of an attorney for an award sponsored
by a bar association or other non-partisan law-related organization.233
One circumstance in which the use of judicial stationery for a law-
related recommendation could arguably be viewed as exerting improper
influence occurs when the recommending judge has an ongoing
authoritative professional relationship with the individual or entity
receiving the judge's recommendation.234 For example, a judge who
recommends an attorney to a law firm that regularly appears before the
231. See Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 2005-1 (2005), available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/2005-1n.html (stating that a judge may use official
stationery to provide a recommendation to a judicial nominating commission because the
judge's position is relevant to commission members); Kan. Ethics Advisory Panel Op.
JE-40 (1992), available at http://www.kscourts.org/pdf/ClerkCt/JE40.pdf ("An
incumbent judge is often in a unique position to measure the qualifications of a potential
[judicial] nominee .... ); Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n Op. 98-689 (1998), available at
http://www.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/ao98-689.htm ("A judge is uniquely able to contribute
insight to the judicial selection process and, thus, to the administration of justice.").
232. See Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 87-01 (1987), available at
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/ethics-opinions/87-0 1.pdf (concluding that the
private interests referred to in Canon 2B do not include interests involved in the judicial
selection process); I11. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 93-9 (1993), available at
http://www.ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/93-9.htm ("The salutary purposes served by...
[Canon 2B] ... prohibitions simply are not furthered by prohibiting a judge from
providing relevant information during the judicial selection process."); S.C. Advisory
Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct Op. 9-1989 (1989), available at
http://www.sccourts.org/adv-opinion/displayadvopin.cfi?advOpinYR = I 989&advOpinN
o=9 (volunteering information relevant to filling a judicial vacancy is consistent with a
judge's responsibility to protect and maintain the quality and integrity of the judiciary)
(citing U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct Op. 59 (1979, revised
1998)); see also In re Hecht, 213 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2006) (holding that a
judge's public statements in support of a nominee to the United States Supreme Court do
not advance the nominee's "private interests" as that phrase is used in Canon 2B).
233. See N.J. Advisory Comm. on Extrajudicial Activities Op. 02-07 (2007) (copy on
file with author) (advising that a judge may- submit a letter on judicial letterhead in
support of a lawyer's nomination for the New Jersey State Bar Association's Pro Bono
Award); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 02-118 (2002), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/02-118-.htm (permitting a letter on
court stationery in support of lawyer's nomination for an award given by the New York
State Bar Association).
234. See N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 05-60 (2005), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/05-60.htm (advising judge against
providing a recommendation letter on behalf of prospective foster parents because the
foster care agencies and social service agencies that would receive the letter regularly
appear before the judge).
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judge may wish to remove the subtle reminder of that relationship by
using personal, not official, stationery. But it is doubtful that failure to
do so would be interpreted as applying pressure in violation of Rule 1.3
because, as noted previously, it is the relationship between the judge and
law firm, not the stationery that causes the "pressure. 235 Likewise, a
judge acting as a reference for an individual applying for a job with
another judge over whom the recommending judge exercises appellate or
supervisory authority may decide to downplay that position of authority
by using private stationery.236 Again, however, it would not be easy to
assign any resulting pressure to the stationery rather than the
relationship. Moreover, in the context of correspondence between
judges, it would be difficult to find that a judge exerted improper
influence over another judge merely by the use of official stationery.
Judges use court stationery all the time to communicate with each other
and they are ethically bound not to let personal or professional
relationships influence judicial conduct.237  Another problematic
situation, one which may come closest to requiring the use of private
stationery, occurs when a judge recommends a job applicant to a public
defender, court clerk, or other person who serves at the pleasure of the
judge. 238 But even in this situation, it is difficult to conclude that less
pressure would result from the use of unofficial stationery or the
telephone.
3. Recommendations Unrelated to Judicial Experience
Most likely the drafters of the new Code were primarily concerned
with the possible misuse of official stationery for letters of
recommendation based upon something other than the judge's expertise
235. See supra text accompanying note 211.
236. The 1990 and 2007 Model Codes do recognize the possibility that under some
circumstances a judge may feel pressured by a request from a supervising or appellate
judge. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4C(3)(b)(i) (1990) (judge may
solicit charitable donations from other judges only if the soliciting judge does not
exercise supervisory or appellate authority over the solicited judge); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7(A)(2) (2007) (same).
237. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1990) ("A judge shall not allow
family, social, political or other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or
judgment."); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.4(B) (2007) ("A judge shall not
permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence
the judge's judicial conduct or judgment.").
238. Cf N.M. Judicial Advisory Comm. Op. 1990-3 (1990) (suggesting that judicial
prestige is misused when a judge sends a recommendation letter to a person or entity over
which the judge exercises official control); In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1997)
(removing chief judge for exerting judicial authority to obtain court-related employment
for a close friend).
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in the law.239 If the content of a recommendation letter, especially one
written for a friend or relative, is totally unrelated to the judge's
experience or position, then the argument can be made that the only
purpose served by the choice of official stationery is to flaunt or
highlight the prestigious position of the letter's author. 240 However, just
because a recommendation is not based upon judicial experience does
not automatically mean that the use of official stationery will improperly
exert pressure or appear to exert pressure on the recipient. 24 1  For
example, recommendation letters on behalf of students seeking
admission to college, graduate school, medical school, or other non-law-
related educational programs may have little relationship to a judge's
judicial experience.242 They also, however, have little likelihood of
exerting, or appearing to exert, pressure on a school's application review
committee. Schools are influenced by substance not stationery. This
fact is demonstrated by the following advice given by the University of
Wisconsin-La Crosse to students in the process of obtaining reference
letters for law school:
A Word About Who Not to Ask: It may seem impressive to have a
high-ranking government official or judge write you a letter of
recommendation. But, if it is someone who barely knows you, the
letter will likely be worthless. Remember, the law schools have been
in the business of assessing recommendations for many years. They
can usually tell the difference between an honest recommendation
239. See supra note 225.
240. It can be argued with equal force that using judicial stationery for
recommendations on behalf of persons known to the judge in other than an official
capacity serves a legitimate purpose by confirming the identity of the author of the
reference. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text; see also The Law School
Admission Council, Letter of Recommendation Form 1-9, (copy on file with author)
(indicating a preference for recommendation letters to be prepared on the recommender's
letterhead); Ohio State University, The Ohio State University Graduate School Reference
Form, http://admissions.osu.edu/apps/pdfs/refer.pdf. ("Each recommendation must
include a completed Reference Form as well as a separate letter from your recommender
written and signed on academic or business letterhead stationery.") (last visited Oct. 2,
2007); Oregon State University, Graduate Required Documents, http://oregonstate.edu/
admissions/graduate/reqdocuments.html ("Reference letters should be written on official
letterhead.") (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
241. This fact was implicitly acknowledged by the drafters of the 2007 Model Code
when they abandoned the provision of the initial draft of the Code restricting the use of
judicial stationery to recommendations "based upon information obtained through the
judge's expertise or experience as a judge .. " MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3.01 cmt. [5] (2007) (Discussion Draft July 2004). All subsequent drafts of the
Code removed this limitation on the use of court stationery for letters of recommendation.
See supra Part IV.A.
242. Although it could be argued that the judge's experience as a college and law
school student provides insight on the character traits, skills, work ethic, study habits, and
motivation that a successful student must possess in any type of educational endeavor.
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and one that comes from calling in a favor.
243
The University of California-Berkeley is less subtle in its advice:
"[L]etters from family friends, political figures, judges, and the like
usually are discouraged and may, in fact, be detrimental." 2"
If these observations, and others like them, 245 are accurate, and law
schools are not pressured by judicial references, then it seems reasonable
to conclude that other educational institutions are not likely to be
pressured by either the title or stationery of judges. This conclusion is
supported by the fact that law schools, more than any other type of
school, have a vested interest in maintaining a good relationship with
judges who often serve as instructors, donors, speakers, search
committee members, and potential employers. If law school officials do
not feel their collars tightening when reviewing letters on judicial
stationery, there is little need to fear pressure on non-law-related
educational institutions that depend far less on the good-will of judges.
Accordingly, official letterhead should not be deemed coercive when
used for an academic reference regardless of the nature of the
educational institution involved and regardless whether the relationship
between the judge and the applicant is personal or professional.
In addition to academic references, judges are asked to provide job
243. University of Wisconsin-La Crosse, Pre-Law Advisement Program, § 5.5.2,
http://www.uwlax.edu/faculty/mcdougal/pl-ltrs.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
244. University of California-Berkeley Career Center, Whom Should I Ask for Letters
of Recommendation?, http://career.berkeley.edu/Law/LawLetter.stm. (last visited Oct. 2,
2007).
245. See University of Massachusetts Amherst Pre-Law Advising Office, Letters of
Recommendation, http://www.umass.edu./prelaw/application.htm ("[Law school
a]dmissions committees are not impressed with letters from famous politicians or judges
that are overly effusive and have little content.") (last visited Oct. 2, 2007); University of
Illinois College of Law, Letters of Recommendation, http://www.law.uiuc.edu/
academics/reqchecklist.asp#rec ("Applicants often believe that their prospects for
admission are greater if they solicit letters of recommendation from judges or public
figures. Many of these recommenders, however, have only a passing knowledge of the
applicant and submit recommendations of little value.") (last visited Oct. 2, 2007);
Boston College, J.L.Polinard, The Pre-Law Student's Letter of Recommendation,
http://www.bc.eduloffices/careers/gradschool/law/lawrecomm.html ("Do not ask public
officials to write on your behalf, [law school] admissions officers tend to ignore letters
written by public officials.") (last visited Oct. 2, 2007); University of Houston,
Frequently Asked Questions-Are letters of Recommendation Required?,
http://www.law.uh.edu/admissions/jd/FAQ.html ("We would rather hear from your
professors, clients, or employers than from an attorney, judge or political officeholder
who does not know you well.") (last visited Oct. 2, 2007); Texas Tech University School
of Law, Law School Application FAQs-Are Letters of Recommendation Required?,
http://www.law.ttu.edu/prospective/admissions/FAQ ("The Admissions Committee
receives very little help from letters written by judges, attorneys, and elected officials if
these persons do not know you in a capacity other than as a family friend.") (last visited
Oct. 2, 2007).
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references for friends and relatives not known to the judge in any other
capacity. An employment reference on court stationery in support of a
friend or relative is not likely to create pressure when received by an
employer who regularly receives recommendation letters from
professionals. Individuals who, as part of their job, routinely evaluate
references and recommendations are unlikely to become overwhelmed or
feel pressured by the letterhead of any professional.246 In fact, a letter to
a hospital, for instance, recommending a doctor, or nurse, or receptionist
is much less likely to exert pressure on the prospective employer than a
recommendation letter sent to a law firm on behalf of someone known to
the judge in the judge's official capacity. Of course, a letter to a hospital
or other prospective employer might very well appear coercive if special
facts are present. Examples include situations where the prospective
employer or the subject of the recommendation is, or is likely to be, a
litigant in the judge's court. But in such circumstances the answer is not
to write the reference on personal stationery; the answer is not to provide
the reference at all.247
Less frequently a judge may have occasion to send a reference on
behalf of a friend or relative to prospective employers who do not
regularly receive recommendations letters or who do not possess the
same level of sophistication in employment matters as hospitals or other
corporate employers. For this category of employer, a judge may wish to
consider personal stationery, although including the "personal"
designation as required by Rule 1.3 should be sufficient to put any
employer on notice that the prestige and influence of the judicial office
does not attach to the recommendation.
While most recommendations by judges relate to school, job,
246. For this same reason a letter on court stationery to a scholarship or fellowship
review committee should not create a concern that judicial influence is being asserted.
247. See ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2B cmt. (2007)
("[Recommendation letters], however, should not be written if the recipient is engaged in
litigation before the judge or it is likely that the recipient will be engaged in proceedings
that would ordinarily come before the court."); Ga. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n Op. 9
(1977) (advising that a judge should not direct an employment recommendation to an
employer who has a case pending in the judge's court); Mo. Comm'n on Ret., Removal
and Discipline Op. 133 (undated) (same); I11. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 95-4 (1995),
available at http://www.ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/95-4.htm ("[P]roviding a
recommendation to a prospective employer knowing that the prospective employer is a
named party in litigation before the judge, could be interpreted as violating [Canon 2A
and 2B]."); ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (2007) ("A recommendation
written or otherwise should not be made if the person who is the subject of the letter is or
is likely to be a litigant in a contested proceeding before the judge's court."); MASS. CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT SCR 3:09 cmt. (2006) (same); WIS. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
SCR 60.03(2) cmt. (2005) ("Such a [recommendation] letter shall not be written if the
person who is the subject of the letter is or is likely to be a litigant engaged in a contested
proceeding before the court.").
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scholarship, bar admission, and similar opportunities, on occasion judges
are requested to write a letter in support of a person seeking other kinds
of benefits.248 New York judges have been permitted to supply
statements of moral fitness on behalf of friends applying for an
acupuncture license249 and acceptance into a housing cooperative. a0
Letters of this type are more akin to a pure character reference 251 than the
248. See, e.g., Ariz. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 92-06 (1992), available at
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/ethics/ethics-opinions/92-06.pdf (approving letter of
recommendation in support of person applying for a position on a government agency or
board); Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 01-7 (2001), available at http://www.ija.org/
ethicsop/opinions/0 I -07.htm (approving recommendation for lawyer seeking
appointment to the governing board of a township political organization); Neb. Judicial
Ethics Comm. Op. 92-7 (1992) (approving letter supporting court clerk's nomination for
"Outstanding County Official of the Year"); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics
Op. 93-26 (1993), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/93-
26_.pdf (approving letter of recommendation on behalf of professor seeking stipend
awarded to faculty "who have enriched the lives of the students of the college"); N.Y.
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 02-123 (2002), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/02-123-.htm (disapproving character
letter on behalf of judge's dog walker to obtain a visa for the dog walker's fiance); S.C.
Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct Op. 15-1994 (1994), available at
http://www.sccourts.org/advopinion/displayadvopin.cfm?advOpinYR= 1 994&advOpinN
o= 15 (disapproving judge serving as a reference for a "Teacher of the Year" candidate).
249. See, e.g., N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 93-12 (1993), available
at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/93-12-.pdf (judge may use judicial
stationery marked "personal and unofficial" to submit letter of good character to
acupuncture licensing board).
250. See, e.g., N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 98-103 (1998), available
at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/98-103_.htm (judge may use
judicial stationery marked "personal and unofficial" to write a general character reference
letter on behalf of a person seeking approval to purchase a unit in a co-operative
apartment building).
251. Judges are prohibited from voluntarily providing character testimony or
character reference letters (whether on official or private stationery) for litigants in
adjudicatory proceedings. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2B (1990) ("A
judge shall not testify voluntarily as a character witness."); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2007) ("A judge shall not testify as a character witness in a judicial,
administrative, or other adjudicatory proceeding or otherwise vouch for the character of a
person in a legal proceeding, except when duly summoned."); see also In re Fogan, 646
So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1994) (impermissible for judge to voluntarily write a character reference
in support of a friend awaiting sentencing); In re Whitaker, 948 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (La.
2007) (finding judge violated Canon 2B by sending a letter on court stationery in support
of a disbarred attorney's application for readmission to the practice of law); In re
Anastasi, 388 A.2d 620 (N.J. 1978) (voluntarily sending letter to the state racing
commission attesting to the license applicant's good name violates Canon 2B); In re
Bonner, Stipulation, Agreement and Order of Admonishment (Wash. Comm'n on
Judicial Conduct Aug. 3, 2007), available at http://www.cjc.state.wa.us/CJCActivity/
public..actions_2007.htm#5324 ("[Plublished ethics advisory opinions and judicial
conduct case law make clear that judges may not, on their own initiative, write a letter on
behalf of a criminal defendant for consideration in sentencing, even if the letter is written
on plain paper and the judicial title is not used."); Ill. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 04-03
(2004), available at http://www.ija.org/ethicsop/opinions/04-03.htm (improper to
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traditional type of recommendation given by professionals for
educational and employment purposes. When a character reference letter
is unrelated to judicial experience,252 written for a friend or relative,
provides no factual information, and is little more than a vouching for the
applicant's honesty, trustworthiness, integrity, or similar character trait,
then the argument that official stationery is used only to influence the
decision maker becomes most compelling. In these situations, public
confidence is enhanced by the use of private stationery. But even letters
that do no more than vouch for a friend's character have been permitted
on court stationery as long as the correspondence clearly indicates that it
represents the judge's personal, unofficial views.25 3
C. Final Word on Interpreting and Applying Comment [2]
The first requirement of Comment [2] to Rule 1.3, while arguably
unnecessary, is clear and simple: Each letter of recommendation written
on official stationery must carry a disclaimer that it is the judge's
personal act.254 Unraveling the meaning of the second requirement of
Comment [2] is more difficult. From the preceding discussion, however,
it can be concluded that the circumstances in which official stationery
will render an otherwise proper recommendation an abuse of judicial
prestige are extremely rare. This is true for several reasons. First,
references and recommendations authorized by the 2007 Model Code are
of the type society expects professionals to routinely provide for
educational, employment, scholarship, and similar purposes. Judges are
not permitted to provide endorsements for a private commercial
voluntarily send character reference on behalf of a judge against whom disciplinary
proceedings are pending); Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 2004-5 (2004), available
at http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/cje/2004-5n.html (judge may not voluntarily write
letter to disciplinary body on behalf of court employee); Nev. Standing Comm. on
Judicial Ethics and Election Practices Op. JE04-004 (2004), available at
http://www.judicial.state.nv.us/je040043new.htm (judge may not voluntarily write a letter
on behalf of a medical doctor facing disciplinary proceedings).
252. Character references in support of bar admission are related to a judge's judicial
experience and therefore should be permitted to appear on court letterhead. See
discussion infra Part IV.D.2; cf Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n Op. 89-357 (1989),
available at http://www.alalinc.net/jic/opinions/ao89-357.htm (permitting judge to supply
character affidavit in support of bar application); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial
Ethics Op. 91-141 (1991), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/
opinions/91-14_.pdf (allowing judge to provide affidavit of good character for bar
applicant); I11. Judicial Ethics Comm. Op. 95-3 (1995), available at http://www.ija.org/
ethicsop/opinions/95-3.htm (permitting judge to sponsor lawyer's admission to practice
before U.S. Supreme Court).
253. See advisory opinions cited supra notes 249-50.
254. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. [2] (2007) ("The judge may
use official letterhead if the judge indicates that the reference is personal ... ").
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venture 255 or other sorts of extraordinary recommendations where the use
of official stationery more likely would be viewed as an attempt to
prostitute the judicial office. Second, judges may only author
recommendations for individuals personally known to the judge. As a
result, every reference will convey first-hand information, further
reducing the likelihood that the letter will viewed as an attempt to
transfer influence rather than information. Third, the vast majority of
recommendations provided by a judge are based on the judge's legal and
judicial experience and therefore related to the judge's official position.
And as previously observed, under the 2007 Model Code, there is
absolutely nothing improper about a judge using his or her title and court
stationery when judicial experience or the judicial office is germane to
the recommendation.256 Fourth, the fact that most employment, school,
bar, and scholarship applications are reviewed by experienced
individuals who are exposed to untolled variations of professional
letterhead reduces the risk that special significance will be attached to
judicial letterhead. Fifth, there can be no more than a trivial risk that the
party receiving a recommendation letter, regardless of their
sophistication level, will interpret the stationery as an indication that the
letter is an official proclamation or order of a court of law. Sixth, the
paucity of disciplinary decisions finding that a judge misused the prestige
of office by providing a recommendation on court stationery is testament
to the fact that the situations in which judicial stationery will transform
an otherwise proper recommendation into a pressure producing one arise
very infrequently.
Rule 1.3, as explained by Comment [2], may require personal
stationery where the recipient of the recommendation serves at the
pleasure of the judge or where the letter provides no factual information
255. See, e.g., Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 95-44 (1995), available at
http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/ninet5/95-
44.html (finding that letter endorsing a high school for use by a real estate agent violates
Canon 2B); Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm Op. 93-34 (1993), available at
http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/ninet3/93-
34.html (finding judge's endorsement of a summer home development improper); N.Y.
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. 05-107 (2005), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/05-107.htm (advising judge not to act
as a reference or provide a recommendation in support of attorney's application for a life
insurance policy); Utah Ethics Advisory Comm. Informal Op. 91-2 (1991), available at
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/ethadv/ethics.opinions/1991/91-2.htm (concluding
that judge's letter to a bank supporting a friend's application for the financing of a
construction business was a misuse of the prestige of office); Wash. Ethics Advisory
Comm. Op. 87-01 (1987), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/programs-orgs/
pos ethics/?fa=pos.ethics.dispopin&mode=8701 (advising judge not to write reference
letter for an attorney seeking malpractice insurance).
256. See supra note 225.
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but only conclusions drawn by the judge as to one or more of the
referent's character traits. 7  Absent aggravating circumstances,
however, it is unlikely that use of official stationery even in these
situations will result in disciplinary proceedings. 58
V. Conclusion
Prestige of judicial office is just that, prestige that attaches to a
public office, not the individual occupying the office. Hence, judicial
prestige only may be used to further the public interests of the judiciary.
Chief Justice Earl Warren suggested the appropriate use of judicial
prestige when he "publicly called for each federal judge to bring the full
prestige of his judicial office to bear 'at every stage of litigation in order
to insure promptness and efficiency. ,,259  By marked contrast,
appropriation of official prestige for the advancement of private interests
undermines the very prestige and respect that is being traded upon and
inevitably erodes public confidence in the judiciary.26° Misappropriation
of judicial prestige can be blatant or subtle. Blatant misuse is best
illustrated by the judicial "Do you know who I am?" syndrome
261
employed by judges to avoid adverse consequences that would befall a
prestige-lacking non-judge. Equally indefensible is the more subtle and
indirect misuse of judicial prestige that many times accompanies official
stationery used for financial, business, and other matters where a
personal advantage is sought. When a judge sends a letter to a tenant of
a building owned by the judge, or a school official concerning a son or
257. See supra notes 238, 248-52 and accompanying text.
258. The 2007 Model Code does not contemplate that every Rule violation will result
in a disciplinary action. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Scope [6] (2007). Whether
a disciplinary action should be initiated depends "upon factors such as the seriousness of
the transgression, the facts and circumstances that existed at the time of the transgression,
the extent of any pattern of improper activity, whether there have been previous
violations, and the effect of the improper activity upon the judicial system or others." Id.
Most often these factors will militate against the filing of a disciplinary action on the sole
basis that official letterhead was improperly used for an otherwise proper letter of
recommendation. See supra note 210.
259. Irving R. Kaufmnan, The Philosophy of Effective Judicial Supervision Over
Litigation, 29 F.R.D. 207, 216 (1961).
260. In re Richardson, 760 So. 2d 932, 933 (Fla. 2000).
261. See, e.g., In re Heiple, Order (III. Cts. Comm'n Apr. 30, 1997) (finding that
Justice Heiple responded to a police officer's instructions by stating, "Oh shut up. Do
you know who you are talking to?" Later in the conversation Justice Heiple reiterated,
"Do you know who I am?" Id.; In re Garza, 161 P.3d 876, 878 (N.M. 2007) (removing
judge in part for asking an officer, "Do you know who I am?"); In re Rushing, Public
Admonishment (Cal. Comm'n on Judicial Performance June 8, 2006), available at
http://cjp.ca.gov/CNCensure/Rushing%20D&O%206-8-06.pdf (finding that the judge
repeatedly invoked her judicial office and that of her husband, an appellate court justice,
in an effort to avoid arrest).
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daughter's disciplinary issues, or an adjoining property owner regarding
a boundary dispute, the judge is acting purely in the unofficial, private
position of landlord, parent, and neighbor. No official prestige attaches
to these everyday positions. Stationery carrying a judge's title, court
designation and official address used for such personal correspondence,
at a minimum, signals that the letter's author is not a mere garden-variety
landlord, parent, or neighbor but a person of influence who must be
reckoned with accordingly. Even worse, official stationery may indicate
to some that the complaint, directive, demand, or other position set out in
the letter is the position of a court. As a result, the presumption that
official stationery exerts or appears to exert pressure in these situations is
fully justified. There simply is no reason to use court stationery for
private disputes or financial, business, parental, charitable, political or
similar personal matters.
Letters of recommendation on official stationery do not present the
same dangers. Whereas a judge's position is irrelevant to letters
concerning a judge's family, financial, business, and other personal
interests discussed in Part III.C.2 of this Article, a judge's judicial
position is highly relevant to the references and recommendations
permitted by judicial codes. Unlike other types of private
correspondence that are prohibited from appearing on official stationery,
recommendation letters do not dispute facts, lodge complaints, put
people on notice, or demand action. Although there are no opinion polls
to confirm the fact, it seems safe to say that public confidence in the
judicial system would not take a substantial blow if the ordinary
reasonable person was to discover that judges use official stationery to
write recommendation letters for school, scholarship, employment,
judicial screening, and bar admission opportunities. Certainly there has
been no public outcry in the many states that permit reference and
recommendation letters to appear on judicial letterhead.
Before adopting Comment [2], a state should assess the extent to
which businesses, colleges, and other recipients of reference letters have
misconstrued court letterhead as an indication of the official rather than
personal nature of a recommendation. If there is some indication that
confusion has existed or may exist in the future, then every reference
letter in that jurisdiction should carry the "personal" disclaimer
suggested by Comment [2]. On the other hand, if there is little reason to
believe that individuals and entities receiving the recommendations
consider them a court act or proclamation, then there is little reason to
require a personal disclaimer, or at least little reason to make the
disclaimer mandatory rather than aspirational. Further, instead of
adopting Comment [2]'s warning concerning the possible misuse of
official stationery for recommendation letters, jurisdictions may wish to
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substitute an admonition against the use of official letterhead for
correspondence concerning personal business, family, and financial
matters. This personal misuse is where the real problem lies. If a
jurisdiction incorporates the provision of Comment [2], which places the
burden on judges to determine precisely when official letterhead creates
pressure in a letter of recommendation, the jurisdiction should add some
examples illustrating the type of situation the rule is meant to cover.
Judges love to follow rules as long as they can tell what the rules are.

